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1. INTRODUCTION
In May 2014, Candis Riggins was fired from her position as a
maintenance worker at Walmart because she had missed work on a
few occasions to seek medical treatment. Ms. Riggins was pregnant
1. Letter from Dina Bakst & Elizabeth Gedmark, A Better Balance, Cyrus
Mehri & Ellen Eardley, Mehri & Skalet, PLLC, & Emily Martin, Elizabeth Watson
& Elizabeth Johnston, Nat'l Women's Law Ctr., to Rebecca Tenbrook & Cynthia
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and, for about two months, had been experiencing pain and illness
2caused by the harsh cleaning chemicals that she used at work.
During this time, Ms. Riggins was hospitalized twice and passed out
.3at a bus stop on one occasion. She repeatedly submitted requests
for a temporary job change, as she was trained and qualified to
perform duties as both a cashier and a greeter.4 However, these
requests were not answered. 5 Meanwhile, according to Ms. Riggins,
employees with non-pregnancy-related medical conditions were
routinely granted accommodations and job changes.6 In other
words, Ms. Riggins alleges that Walmart denied accommodations to
a pregnant worker that it routinely granted to other employees;
Walmart even went so far as to fire Ms. Riggins when her medical
conditions became so bad that she started to miss work.7 This
incident is just one recent example of family responsibilities
discrimination (FRD) faced by many women and men in the
United States.
Family responsibilities discrimination is discrimination against
an individual because of his or her real or perceived caregiving
responsibilities.8 FRD can take many different forms, including
denying a mother a promotion because her employer assumes that
she does not want to travel for work, or denying a father family
leave because his employer thinks his wife should be taking care of
things at home.9 FRD jurisprudence developed rapidly over the last
decade, and cases arise under various legal causes of action related
to employment discrimination.' ° Unfortunately, plaintiffs' success
Scott, Senior Assoc. Gen. Counsel & Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Walmart Stores, Inc. 3
(Jul. 31, 2014), http://www.abetterbalance.org/web/images/stories/Documents
/RigginsCandisLetter_7-31-14_FINAL.pdf.
2. Id. at 2-3.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2-4.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 3.
7. See also Amicns Curiae Brief of the Am. Civil Liberties Union & a Better
Balance, et al., in Support of Petitioner, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. at 7, 707
F.3d 437 (2014) (No. 12-1226), 2014 WL 4536938, at *7 (asserting that UPS, in
violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, denied light duty to pregnant
workers that it routinely provided other employees).
8. Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, Caregivers in the Courtroom: The
Growing Trend of Family Responsibilities Discrimination, 41 U.S.F. L. REv. 171, 171
(2006).
9. Id. at 177-78, 181. These examples are drawn from real FRD cases. Id.
10. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 8, at 172, 181-82.
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in FRD cases often depends on individual lawyers' and judges'
understanding of gender stereotyping; as a result, inconsistent and
inaccurate folk theories about gender stereotypes often impact case
outcomes." One particularly harmful implication of this problem
has been the use of the same-actor inference to dismiss meritorious
FRD cases." The same-actor inference is a strong presumption of
non-discrimination that arises when the same actor who engaged in
an adverse action against the employee previously engaged in a
positive action toward that employee." The same-actor inference is
based on lay theories of psychology that persist despite being
contradicted by decades of empirical psychological research.
This Article posits that although social psychological research
has thoroughly refuted the validity of the same-actor inference,
courts continue to use it to dismiss FRD cases that have merit. Part
II of this Article describes existing social psychological research on
FRD in the workplace. 4 Researchers have established that FRD is
discrimination based on sex and that stereotyping and
discrimination are highly context dependent.'5 Part III analyzes the
extent to which the same-actor inference has been disproven by
social psychological evidence, as well as its harmful role in FRD
litigation.' 6 The same-actor inference rests on the faulty assumption
that individuals' stereotypes and prejudices are consistently
expressed in a conscious, discrete manner against all individuals
from a protected class.' 7 It causes significant harm to plaintiffs in
FRD cases and is at odds with the purpose of Title VII. I8 Part IV
discusses possible solutions to the problem and proposes that the
same-actor inference be abolished from FRD cases under Title
11. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Intuitive Psychologist Behind the
Bench: Models of Gender Bias in Social Psychology and Employment Discrimination Law,
60 J. Soc. ISSUEs 835, 835 (2004) (arguing that "[fllawed intuitive psychological
models presently limit the law's effectiveness in dismantling the maternal wall").
12. See, e.g., Hayden v. Garden Ridge Mgmt., LLC, Civil Action No.
4:08CV172, 2009 WL 5196718, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2009); see also Andrea
Miller, Note, The Separate Spheres Ideology: An Improved Empirical and Litigation
Approach to Family Responsibilities Discrimination, 99 MINN. L. REv. 343, 345 (2014).
13. See Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991).
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part III.A.3.a.
18. See infra Part III.B.
2015] 1035
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VII. This Article argues that by eliminating the same-actor
inference from FRD litigation, judges can adopt an empirically
grounded social psychological understanding of FRD, develop a
body of law that reflects the realities of gender roles in modern
society, and provide the kind of justice to FRD plaintiffs that Title
VII is meant to provide.0
II. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON FLEXIBILITY STIGMA AND
FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION
Legal scholars who study FRD have been in tune with social
science knowledge regarding gender inequality in the workplace21
from the time FRD first developed as a legal claim. This attention
to social science has helped ground FRD scholarship in empirical
reality and has most likely contributed to the development of FRD
law in ways that reflect the actual lived experiences of the men and
22women harmed by rigid gender norms and gendered inequality.
This Part provides background information on the current state of
gendered workplace inequality and on the existing social
psychological research that informs FRD theorizing.
A. Gender Inequality in the United States Is Linked to Caregiver Status
In many ways, the United States has made substantial progress
toward gender equality. For example, income levels for women
under thirty who have no children are almost equal to those of
men in the same category." For women who are mothers, however,
persistent and dramatic forms of inequality remain. The
motherhood penalty, or the "maternal wall," has severe economic
consequences for women.24 As of 2010, for example, mothers
19. See infra Part IV. The same-actor inference likely causes similar problems
in all types of discrimination cases; however, other forms of discrimination are
outside the scope of this Article.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. SeeJOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT
AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 101-10 (2000) [hereinafter UNBENDING GENDER]. See
generally Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to
Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the "Cluelessness" Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL'YJ. 401 (2003).
22. See Miller, supra note 12, at 346.
23. JoAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND
CLASS MAT-ER 15 (2010).
24. Id.
1036 [Vol. 41:3
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earned sixty-seven cents for every dollar earned by fathers,25
suggesting that "motherhood may in fact have replaced gender as
the primary factor constraining women's choices."2 3 It is clear that
gender inequality cannot simply be reduced to sex or gender; it is
often driven by the intersection between gender and caregiving
responsibilities.2 7 Legal scholarship and social-science research on
FRD recognize this complexity and attempt to address gendered
inequality in the workplace as it relates to caregiving. .. 28
responsibilities. Fortunately, legal scholars have access to years of
research from social psychologists on stereotyping and
discrimination processes in the workplace as they relate to gender
29and caregiving responsibilities.
B. Social Psychological Research that Informs Family Responsibilities
Discrimination
Social psychologists have spent decades examining
stereotyping and discrimination processes in the workplace to try to
understand inequality based on gender and other factors.3
Stereotypes are beliefs about the traits or characteristics of
members of a group.31 The act of stereotyping is assuming that an
individual has a particular trait or characteristic because he or she
25. JOAN WILLIAMS ET AL., CENTER FOR WoRKLIFE LAW, "OPT OUT" OR PUSHED
OUT?: How THE PRESS COvERS WORK/FAMILY CONFLICT 17 (2006) [hereinafter
CENTER FOR WoRKLIFE LAW], available at http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs
/OptOutPushedOut.pdf.
26. STEPHANIE COoNTz, A STRANGE STIRRING: THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE AND
AMERICAN WOMEN AT THE DAwN OFTHE 1960s, at 177-78 (2011).
27. Stephanie Bornstein, Work, Family, and Discrimination at the Bottom of the
Ladder, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1, 25-28, 34-39 (2012). Gender
inequality is also characterized by intersections with race, class, sexuality,
immigrant status, disability, and many other sources of inequality. See, e.g., id. at
30-40; Joan C. Williams et al., Cultural Schemas, Social Class, and the Flexibility Stigma,
69 J. Soc. IssuEs 209, 227 (2013) [hereinafter Cultural Schemas]. While these
intersecting identities are important parts of gender inequality and FRD, they are
outside the scope of this paper.
28. See generally UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 21; CENTER FOR WoRKLIFE
LAW, supra note 25.
29. See infra Part II.B. 1.
30. See infra Part II.B. 1.
31. See Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 2 THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 357 (Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske &
Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998) (distinguishing stereotyping as a cognitive
attitude "to people from groups perceived to differ significantly from one's own").
2015] 1037
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is a member of that group.32 Discrimination, in contrast, is more
behavioral; it is making a decision about an individual or taking an
action against an individual because he or she is a member of a
particular group.33 Although there is still more work to be done, 4
social psychological research has led to at least two broad principles
of stereotyping and discrimination that can inform legal
scholarship on FRD and other types of discrimination. These
principles are well established by decades of empirical evidence.
35
The first principle is that FRD is characterized by descriptive and
prescriptive stereotypes about men and women, meaning that it is
discrimination based on sex.36 The second principle is that
stereotyping and discrimination are context dependent.3 7 The
remainder of this Part will discuss each of these principles in turn.
1. Family Responsibilities Discrimination Is Based on Sex and
Gender
For more than a decade, the dominant social psychological
approach to studying FRD has been to investigate the role of
descriptive and prescriptive gender stereotypes.' Until recently,
research on descriptive and prescriptive stereotyping in FRD
focused primarily on discrimination against women. 9  More
32. See id. at 368.
33. Id. at 357.
34. Miller, supra note 12, at 378 (noting that "many courts believe that their
lay theories of gender stereotypes and discrimination" are adequate to achieve
justice).
35. See generally Cultural Schemas, supra note 27; James L. Hilton & William
von Hippel, Stereotypes, 47 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 237, 238-40 (1996).
36. Miller, supra note 12, at 348-50 (highlighting the stereotypical
differences between the sexes).
37. Hilton & von Hippel, supra note 35, at 255-56.
38. See, e.g., Diana Burgess & Eugene Borgida, Who Women Are, Who Women
Should Be: Descriptive and Prescriptive Gender Stereotyping in Sex Discrimination, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 665 (1999); Joan C. Williams, Hibbs as a Federalism Case;
Hibbs as a Maternal Wall Case, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 365, 387 (2004);Joan C. Williams
& Allison Tait, "Mancession" or "Momcession"?: Good Providers, a Bad Economy, and
Gender Discrimination, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REv 857, 865 (2011).
39. See generally, e.g., Michelle Hebl et al., Hostile and Benevolent Reactions
Toward Pregnant Women: Complementary Interpersonal Punishments and Rewards that
Maintain Traditional Roles, 92J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1499 (2007); Laurie A. Rudman
& Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and Backlash Toward Agentic Women, 57J.
Soc. ISSUEs 743 (2001); Pamela Stone & Lisa Ackerly Hernandez, The All-or-Nothing
Workplace: Flexibility Stigma and "Opting Out" Among Professional-Managerial Women,
1038 [Vol. 41:3
7
Miller: The Use (and Misuse) of the Same-Actor Inference in Family Respon
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
THE SAME-ACTOR INFERENCE IN FRD CASES
recently, researchers have also begun to examine the negative
effects of descriptive and prescriptive stereotyping against men.40
Taken together, this body of research makes clear that FRD is
discrimination based on sex and gender.
a. Family Responsibilities Discrimination Against Gender-
Conforming Women
Descriptive stereotypes describe how men and women are
generally thought to be. According to traditional gender
stereotypes, men are agentic and competent and women are
42communal and warm. When a woman announces she is pregnant,
has a child, or otherwise activates caregiving concepts in the
workplace, people tend to see her as having more feminine
attributes (i.e., warmth) and fewer masculine attributes (i.e.,
41competence) . People who endorse these descriptive stereotypes
tend to assume that mothers are less agentic, competent, and
committed to the workplace than non-mothers, because mothers144
seem to fit the descriptive stereotypes of women. One of the
consequences of descriptive stereotypes about women is FRD. The
perception that women who engage in caregiving are less
competent can lead to lower salary,' fewer promotions, lower
69J. Soc. IssuEs 235 (2013).
40. See generally Scott Coltrane et al., Fathers and the Flexibility Stigma, 69 J. Soc.
ISSUES 279 (2013); Laurie A. Rudman & Kris Mescher, Penalizing Men Who Request a
Family Leave: Is Flexibility Stigma a Femininity Stigma?, 69 J. Soc. ISSUES 322 (2013);
Joseph A. Vandello et al., When Equal Isn't Really Equal: The Masculine Dilemma of
Seeking Work Flexibility, 69 J. Soc. ISSUES 303 (2013).
41. Madeline E. Heilman, Description and Prescription: How Gender Stereotypes
Prevent Women's Ascent Up the Organizational Ladder, 57 J. Soc. ISSUES 657, 658-59
(2001).
42. Id. at 658.
43. Amy Cuddy et al., When Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth Doesn't Cut the
Ice, 60J. Soc. ISSUES 701, 711 (2004); see also Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of (Often
Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow from Perceived
Status and Competition, 82J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 878, 887 (2002) (finding
that housewives are consistently perceived as high in warmth and low in
competence). See generally Heilman, supra note 41, at 666-69.
44. Kathleen Fuegen et al., Mothers and Fathers in the Workplace: How Gender
and Parental Status Influence Judgments ofJob-Related Competence, 60 J. Soc. ISSUES 737,
748 (2004).
45. Tamar Kricheli-Katz, Choice-Based Discrimination: Labor-Force-Type
Discrimination Against Gay Men, the Obese, and Mothers, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES
670, 682 (2013).
2015] 1039
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hiring rates," and less willingness to educate mothers compared to
other employees.18 Women are also penalized by the assumption
that they may become caregivers, even when they have not had
children.49
In contrast to descriptive stereotypes, prescriptive stereotypes
describe how men and women should be. People who endorse
prescriptive gender stereotypes tend to believe that men should be
agentic and competent and that women should be communal and
warmn i5 In employment, this means that people tend to believe that
women should engage in caregiving rather than pursuing career
achievement.5 Like descriptive stereotypes, prescriptive stereotypes
about women can lead to FRD. For example, in many
organizations, there is a stigma against women who make use of
their companies' flexibility golicies (e.g., part-time hours, parental
leave, and telecommuting). This phenomenon is called "flexibility
stigma."54 Flexibility stigma can result in wage penalties, lower
performance evaluations, fewer promotions, and lower-status
assignments.55 For women, this stigma originates in prescriptive
stereotypes that expect women to prioritize childrearing over their
careers, which makes them ideal parents but bad employees. 56
Women who are mothers or who use flexibility benefits at work are
seen as fulfilling their proper gender role by engaging in caregiving
but deviating from proper workplace performance. 57 In many
workplaces, women are actually praised for opting out of the
46. Madeline E. Heilman & Tyler G. Okimoto, Motherhood: A Potential Source
of Bias in Employment Decisions, 93J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 189, 196 (2008).
47. Cuddy et al., supra note 43, at 711; Kricheli-Katz, supra note 45, at 681.
48. Cuddy et al., supra note 43, at 711.
49. See Alexander H. Jordan & Emily M. Zitek, Marital Status Bias in
Perceptions of Employees, 34 BAsic & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 474, 474-75, 479 (2012).
50. Heilman, supra note 41, at 659.
51. Id.
52. See generally Hebi et al., supra note 39; Rudman & Glick, supra note 39.
53. Cultural Schemas, supra note 27, at 209-10.
54. Id.
55. Jeffrey R. Cohen & Louise E. Single, An Examination of the Perceived Impact
of Flexible Work Arrangements on Professional Opportunities in Public Accounting, 32 J.
Bus. ETHICS 317, 324-25 (2001); Jennifer Glass, Blessing or Curse?: Work-Family
Policies and Mother's Wage Growth Over Time, 31 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 367, 387
(2004); Stone & Hernandez, supra note 39, at 246-52. See generally PAMELA STONE,
OPTING Our?: WHY WOMEN REALLY QuIT CAREERS AND HEAD HOME (2007).
56. Cultural Schemas, supra note 27, at 221-22.
57. Id.
1040 [Vol. 41:3
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workplace entirely to care for their children but are punished if
they stay at work and make use of flexibility policies. Accordingly,
while FRD against women is based on their actual or perceived
caregiving duties, it is also based on descriptive and prescriptive
stereotypes about women belonging in the home rather than the
workplace. In other words, although this type of FRD occurs against
a specific sub-group of women, it is based on sex and gender.
b. Family Responsibilities Discrimination Against Gender-
Nonconforming Men
In recent years, researchers have increasingly recognized that
gender equality in the workplace is not simply a matter of women's
work-life conflict and the treatment of women at work; in order for
society to achieve gender equality, men must be able to participate
fully in their family lives9 Men, like women, experience FRD at
work, but FRD against men originates in different prescriptive
stereotypes. Prescriptive stereotypes of men dictate that they should
devote themselves fully to the workplace, displaying agency,S 60
competence, and commitment. Because earning a living is seen as
the primary role of fatherhood, fathers are penalized for using
flexibility benefits at work; using flexibility benefits is regarded as
inappropriate for men, because it suggests that they are not
completely devoted to their careers." In sum, FRD for men results
from men's gender-nonconforming behavior. This is in contrast to
FRD against women, which results from the supposedly gender-
conforming behavior of prioritizing children over work.1
2
Therefore, although both men and women experience FRD, this
stigma is highly gendered and manifests against men and women in
58. Stone & Hernandez, supra note 39, at 252.
59. See Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-Family
Conflicts of Men, 63 HASTINGS LJ. 1297, 1299-1300 (2012); Joan C. Williams,
Jumpstarting the Stalled Gender Revolution: Justice Ginsburg and Reconstructive Feminism,
63 HASTINGS L.J. 1267, 1282-86 (2012). See generally Kelli K. Garcia, The Gender
Bind: Men as Inauthentic Caregivers, 20 DuKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1 (2012).
60. Cultural Schemas, supra note 27, at 220-21; Williams & Tait, supra note 38,
at 865-69.
61. Jennifer L. Berdahl & Sue H. Moon, Workplace Mistreatment of Middle Class
Workers Based on Sex, Parenthood, and Caregiving, 69 J. Soc. IssuEs 341, 358 (2013);
Coltrane et al., supra note 40, at 297-98; Rudman & Mescher, supra note 40, at
335-36; Vandello et al., supra note 40, at 315-16.
62. See supra Part II.B. 1.a.
2015]
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distinct ways. Although FRD is directed primarily at subsets of men
and women, social psychological evidence makes clear that FRD is
discrimination based on sex and gender.
2. Stereotyping and Discrimination Are Context Dependent
One important feature of social psychology as a discipline is its
focus on the power of social situations to shape individuals'
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Years of research on
stereotyping and discrimination have made clear that these
processes, like any other psychological process, are context
dependent. 64 Depending on the social context, an individual's
stereotypes or prejudices regarding a social group are not always
expressed or may be expressed in different ways.
a. Structural Constraints Influence Stereotyping and
Discrimination
One important aspect of social context that influences
stereotyping and discrimination is the existence of structural
constraints on decision making. 6 In many cases, people are aware
that it is socially unacceptable to discriminate. Individuals
sometimes alter their behavior because they do not want to be
63. See Gordon W. Allport, The Historical Background of Social Psychology, in
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY I (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 3d
ed. 1985).
64. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism
in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 997, 1039-41 (2006) (characterizing situationism as "one of the most
important" concepts to emerge in social psychology over the last fifty years).
65. See generally Christian S. Crandall & Amy Eshleman, A Justification-
Suppression Model of the Expression and Experience of Prejudice, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 414
(2003) (examining in depth the theory that prejudice is often restrained by a
desire to suppress it).
66. See, e.g., id. at 415 ("White Americans do not wish to express prejudice in
word or deed, for reasons that include liberalism, egalitarianism, sympathy for the
underdog, maintaining a nonprejudiced self-image, social norms, 'political
correctness,' and humanitarian values.").
67. See Hilton & von Hippel, supra note 35, at 255-56. See generally Ziva Kunda
& Steven J. Spencer, When Do Stereotypes Come to Mind and Wen Do They Color
Judgmnent? A Goal-Based Theoretical Framework for Stereotype Activation and Application,
129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 522, 525 (2003) (discussing the nexus between social pressure
and avoiding prejudice).
1042 [Vol. 41:3
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caught stereotyping or discriminating. 6' Sometimes the structural
features of the situation are such that discriminatory behaviors will
be obvious; other times, discriminator behaviors can be concealed
using a non-discriminatory pretext. Social psychologists have
found that when the structural features of the environment make
discriminatory behaviors easily identifiable, individuals are lessS 70
likely to engage in these behaviors. In one study, for example,
individuals were more likely to avoid sitting next to an individual
with a disability when that decision could be masked as a
preference to watch a different movie.7' In another study,
individuals were more likely to discriminate against a child in
academic ratings on the basis of socio-economic status when they
could attribute their ratings to other, more individuating
information (even though this individuating information was
identical for all subjects). In a third study, discrimination against
black college applicants was "most likely to be expressed when . . .
negative responses [could] be justified on factors other than
68. See generally Kunda & Spencer, supra note 67 ("The motivation to avoid
prejudice can also prompt such inhibition when perceivers believe that any
stereotyping may indicate prejudice."); Melvin L. Snyder et al., Avoidance of the
Handicapped: An Attributional Ambiguity Analysis, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
2297 (1979) (analyzing the findings of a study testing the theory that people may
purposely choose to sit next to a physically handicapped person in a theater to
avoid appearing prejudicial).
69. See, e.g., Snyder et al., supra note 68, at 2297 ("However, if we ask a person
to choose between two movies, one of which apparently by accident happens to
entail sitting next to a handicapped person, the other next to a normal, he can
avoid the handicapped while appearing to exercise a preference for a movie.").
70. See generally John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias
in Labeling Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 20, 30 (1983) (speculating
that participants in study may have been less likely to discriminate based on
awareness they were being observed); Gordon Hodson et al., Processes in Racial
Discrimination: Differential Weighting of Conflicting Information, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 460, 460 (2002) (observing that participants in study did not
discriminate against black applicants relative to white applicants when their
credentials were identical); Snyder et al., supra note 68, at 2298 (discussing a
strategy to detect concealed prejudice when structural factors make identification
difficult); Vincent Y. Yzerbyt et al., Social Judgeability: The Impact of Meta-
Informational Cues on the Use of Stereotypes, 66 J. PERSONALIY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 48, 48
(1994) (demonstrating the results of a study supporting the notion that people
may take social rules into consideration before discriminating).
71. See Snyder et al., supra note 68, at 2303-04.
72. See Darley & Gross, supra note 70, at 20.
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race."' 73 However, the information the study participants relied on
was not actually diagnostic of perceived merit; across study
conditions, participants heavily weighted whichever piece of
74information was weaker for the black applicant.
Generally speaking, the research shows that the presence of
some individuating information frees people to discriminate
against others when they otherwise would not, for fear of having
their discrimination be revealed.7 5 Social norms regarding the
appropriateness of discrimination can be very powerful; individuals
sometimes go so far as to engage in more stereotyping and
discrimination when these individuals perceive the social norms of
the situation to encourage this conduct. One study found that
black men were more likely to denigrate a Native American job
applicant to a white audience when the participants believed that
the white audience endorsed negative attitudes about Native
Americans.76 In these cases, the evaluations that black participants
expressed to the white audience were actually more negative than
the impressions the participants privately held.77 The black
participants, however, did not denigrate the Native American
applicant when the participants perceived the white audience to
hold positive attitudes about Native Americans. 7s Thus, although
individuals typically make use of informational and structural
environments to mask discrimination when it would be perceived
as undesirable, discriminatory activity may also increase when
doing so is perceived as the norm. In either case, individuals
adjust the use of stereotypes and discrimination based on the
structural and normative features of the environment around
them.80 This research highlights the context-dependent nature of
stereotyping and discriminating, and it makes clear that individuals
73. See Hodson et al., supra note 70, at 469.
74. Id.
75. See William G. Graziano et al., Attraction, Personality, and Prejudice: Liking
None of the People Most of the Time, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 565, 579
(2007) (examining, in Study 5, anti-fat attitudes and situations in which people
may suppress prejudice toward overweight partners).
76. Jenessa R. Shapiro & Steven L. Neuberg, When Do the Stigmatized
Stigmatize? The Ironic Effects of Being Accountable to (Perceived) Majority Group Prejudice-
Expression Norms, 95J. PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. 877, 894 (2008).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
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do not always act on personal stereotypes and biases against a given
group in the same way."'
Applying these findings to the context of FRD, the research
suggests that although a supervisor's discriminatory conduct
against an employee with family responsibilities is rooted in gender
stereotypes, it does not follow that the supervisor will always have
the opportunity to express these stereotypes as discriminatory
conduct. The structural features of a particular decision-making
context might make it more difficult to engage in FRD (without
being detected) at some times than at others.
b. Motivation Influences Stereotyping and Discrimination
Another aspect of the social context that may influence
stereotyping and discrimination in the workplace is individual
motivation. Social psychology research reveals that individuals
strategically make use of stereotypes and engage in discrimination
depending on individual motivations in any given situation. " In
one study, for example, individuals discriminated against women
instructors and managers by giving them negative ratings relative to
men, but only after receiving negative evaluations themselves.83 In
other words, individuals who had received negative evaluations and
were motivated to restore self-esteem engaged in sex
discrimination, whereas participants who had received positive
84evaluations did not engage in sex discrimination. In another
study, participants watching an interview of a black individual
experienced cognitive activation of racial stereotypes after fifteen
seconds of the interview, but the stereotypes dissipated over time as
the participants learned more individuating information about the
black individual.8 5 However, participants who discovered at the end
of the interview that the black individual disagreed with the
participant about the verdict in a court case revived racial
stereotypes, and participants who agreed with the black individual
81. See id.
82. See, e.g., Ziva Kunda et al., The Dynamic Time Course of Stereotype Activation:
Activation, Dissipation, and Resurrection, 82 J. PERSONALFIY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 283, 295
(2002); Lisa Sinclair & Ziva Kunda, Motivated Stereotyping of Women: She's Fine if She
Praised Me but Incompetent if She Criticized Me, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
1329, 1340 (2000).
83. See Sinclair & Kunda, supra note 82, at 1340.
84. Id.
85. See Kunda et al., supra note 82, at 295.
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did not engage in racial stereotyping. 6 Taken together, this
research makes clear that individuals modulate the use of
stereotypes and discriminatory behavior in strategic ways according
to individual motivations at any given time; stereotyping and
discrimination against a specific group of people are not uniform
across situations. To place this research in the FRD context, these
findings suggest that although a supervisor might harbor gendered
stereotypes about employees with family responsibilities, he or she
may only be motivated to express these stereotypes as
discriminatory conduct in certain situations.""
c. Past Non-Discrimination Influences Stereotyping and
Discrimination in the Present
A third feature of the social context that may influence
individuals' stereotyping and discrimination is past conduct. When
individuals engage in behaviors that individuals deem positive,
prosocial, or morally right, they perceive themselves as having
gained "moral credentials '' 9 or "legitimacy credits." These
credentials then free people (subjectively) to engage in more
problematic or antisocial behaviors, including discrimination. 9'
One study, for example, found that participants who expressed
disagreement with sexist statements were subsequently more willing
to discriminate against women in hiring.92 In other studies,
participants who gave high ratings of an advertisement featuring a
black model were then more likely to discriminate against black
models in ratings of subsequent advertisements;93 participants who
chose a black applicant for one job were then more likely to
discriminate against a black applicant for a subsequent job;94 and
participants who recalled times in the past in which they did not
take racist actions later made hiring decisions and allocated money
86. Id.
87. See id.; Sinclair & Kunda, supra note 82, at 1340.
88. See Kunda et al., supra note 82, at 295.
89. See generally Benoit Monin & Dale T. Miller, Moral Credentials and the
Expression of Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 33 (2001).
90. See Crandall & Eshleman, supra note 65, at 428-29.
91. See id. See generally Monin & Miller, supra note 89.
92. See Monin & Miller, supra note 89, at 35.
93. See Beomjoon Choi et al., Permission to Be Prejudiced: Legitimacy Credits in
the Evaluation of Advertisements, 44J. APPLIED. PSYcHOL. 190, 197 (2014).
94. See Monin & Miller, supra note 89, at 37.
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in racially discriminatory ways. In some cases, individuals rely on
others' moral credentials to justify their discriminatory behavior.9 6
Participants in one study who learned of previous non-
discriminatory behavior by members of their own group were then
more likely to engage in discrimination in hiring.9 Finally, a group
of studies revealed that individuals strategically build up moral
credentials in advance when they anticipate engaging in
discrimination in the future.9 Participants who expected to reject a
black job applicant in the near future preemptively took action to
acquire moral credentials by expressing greater racial sensitivity;
they were then more likely to reject the black applicant for a job
later on. Taken together, this research challenges the common-
sense wisdom that people who have not engaged in stereotyping
and discrimination in the past will not do so in the future. At times,
the very act of being egalitarian or prosocial frees individuals to
engage in discrimination later.'00 These findings make clear that
stereotyping and discrimination against a particular group are not
consistent over time and across situations. In the FRD context, this
means that individuals who hire employees with family
responsibilities are not only not immune from discriminating
against these employees in the future, but may actually feel more
licensed to do so.
d. Cognitive, Physical, and Self-Regulatory Resources Influence
Stereotyping and Discrimination
Another feature of the situation that can have an impact on
stereotyping and discrimination is the set of cognitive, physical, and
self-regulatory resources available to the individual at any particular
time. Social psychology research has generally revealed that it takes
95. See Daniel A. Effron et al., Inventing Racist Roads Not Taken: The Licensing
Effect of Immoral Counterfactual Behaviors, 103 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 916,
928 (2012).
96. Maryam Kouchaki, Vicarious Moral Licensing: The Influence of Others' Past
Moral Actions on Moral Behavior, 101 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 702, 713
(2011).
97. Id.
98. See Anna C. Merritt et al., The Strategic Pursuit of Moral Credentials, 48 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 774, 774-76 (2012).
99. Id. at 775.
100. Id. at 776.
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effort to inhibit stereotyping and discrimination. TM To the extent
that individuals are more or less able to exert this effort in any
given situation, the likelihood of stereotyping and discrimination
varies depending on the levels of cognitive load.' Heavy cognitive
load, a situation in which an individual uses high cognitive effort
and has few cognitive resources to spare, is one situation in which
individuals tend to lack the mental resources necessary to inhibit
stereotyping and discriminatory behavior. 0 3 In one study, for
example, participants who were under heavy cognitive load had an
easier time recalling stereotype-consistent information about
another individual, whereas participants who experienced low
cognitive processing loads were more likely to recall individuating,
stereotype-inconsistent information. 10 4  In another study,
participants rated male workers' performance higher than female
workers' performance when the participants' attention was divided
and they faced time pressure; without these cognitive constraints,
discrimination in performance ratings diminished. 1 5 In other
studies, heavy cognitive load led to age discrimination in the
evaluation of job applications,' 0  ethnic stereotyping and• . 107
prejudice, sex discrimination in evaluations of leadership
101. See Marilynn B. Brewer, A Dual Process Model of Impression Formation, in
ADVANCES IN SOCIAL COGNITION 1, 27-30 (Thomas R. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr.
eds., 1988); Susan T. Fiske et al., The Continuum Model: Ten Years Later, in DuAL
PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 231, 237 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope
eds., 1999).
102. See Diana J. Burgess, Are Providers More Likely to Contribute to Healthcare
Disparities Under High Levels of Cognitive Load? How Features of the Healthcare Setting
May Lead to Biases in Medical Decision Making, 30 MED. DECISION MAKING 246, 247-
48 (2010).
103. See, e.g., Russell Spears & S. Alexander Haslam, Stereotyping and the Burden
of Cognitive Load, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF STEREOTYPING AND GROUP LIFE 171,
171 (Russell Spears et al. eds., 1997).
104. C. Neil Macrae et al., Processing Load and Memory for Stereotype-Based
Information, 23 EUR.J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 77, 77-78 (1993).
105. See Richard F. Martell, Sex Bias at Work: The Effects of Attentional and Memory
Demands on Performance Ratings of Men and Women, 21 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1939,
1950 (1991).
106. See Elissa L. Perry et al., Moderating Effects of Personal and Contextual Factors
in Age Discrimination, 81 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 628, 638 (1996).
107. AntonJ. Dijker & Willem Koomen, Stereotyping and Attitudinal Effects Under
Time Pressure, 26 EUR.J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 61, 69 (1996); Daniel H. Wigboldus et al.,
Capacity and Comprehension: Spontaneous Stereotyping Under Cognitive Load, 22 Soc.
COGNITION 292, 299-300 (2004).
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10810
competence, gender stereotyping of computer behavior,1°° and
racial discrimination in police shooter simulations. ° Taken
together, this body of research indicates that an individual's
tendency to engage in stereotyping and discrimination depends on
the cognitive resources available at any given moment.
In addition to cognitive resources, the availability of physical
and self-regulatory resources can influence the extent to which an
individual is capable of inhibiting stereotypes and discriminatory
responses. Research on resource depletion (also called "regulatory
depletion") indicates that hunger, exhaustion, the use of self-
control, and other forms of resource depletion can decrease an
individual's ability to inhibit stereotyping and discrimination. In
one study, for example, participants who engaged in self-control to
suppress their stereotypes for a period of time experienced a
depletion of regulatory resources; the stereotypes they had been
suppressing then became particularly salient in a subsequent task."'
In another set of studies, individuals who were sleepy were more
likely to stereotype Muslim women and to discriminate against
blackjob applicants. Other researchers have found that resource
depletion leads to racial biases in both police officers' shooting
decisions"' and weapons identification tasks.'' 4 This body of
research, along with the research on cognitive load, demonstrates
108. Sabine Sczesny & Ulrich Kuihnen, Meta-Cognition About Biological Sex and
Gender-Stereotypic Physical Appearance: Consequences for the Assessment of Leadership
Competence, 30 PERSONALITY& Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 13, 18 (2004).
109. Eun-Ju Lee, Gender Stereotyping of Computers: Resource Depletion or Reduced
Attention?, 58J. COMM. 301, 308 (2008).
110. Sang Hee Park et al., Implicit Motivation to Control Prejudice Moderates the
Effect of Cognitive Depletion on Unintended Discrimination, 26 SOC. COGNITION 401,
412-13 (2008) (finding that cognitive depletion led to racial shooter biases among
those with a low motivation to control prejudice).
111. Ernestine H. Gordijn et al., Consequences of Stereotype Suppression and
Internal Suppression Motivation: A Self-Regulation Approach, 30 PERSONALrIY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 212, 218-21 (2004) (finding that stereotype suppression led to
greater activation of stereotypes and greater use of stereotypes among those with a
low motivation to suppress stereotypes).
112. Sonia Ghumman & Christopher M. Barnes, Sleep and Prejudice: A Resource
Recovery Approach, 43J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. E166, E169-71 (2013).
113. Debbie S. Ma et al., When Fatigue Turns Deadly: The Association Between
Fatigue and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 35 BASIc & APPLIED SOC. PSYcHOL. 515,
522-23 (2013).
114. Olesya Govorun & Keith Payne, Ego-Depletion and Prejudice: Separating
Automatic and Controlled Components, 24 SOC. COGNITION I 11, 120-21, 128 (2006).
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that an individual's ability to suppress tendencies toward
stereotyping and discrimination depends on the available cognitive,
physical, and self-regulatory resources. These findings make clear
that an individual's tendency to express stereotypes and biases
against various groups in society is not stable over time and is
highly context dependent. Thus, rates of FRD from any given
supervisor may vary from situation to situation based on the
cognitive resources available to the supervisor.
e. Priming Influences Stereotyping and Discrimination
A fifth feature of the social context that can influence
stereotyping and discrimination is the extent to which individuals
are primed by their surroundings. A large body of research in
psychology suggests that exposure to messages in society, even
outside of conscious awareness, can influence how we perceive and
respond to others.'1 5 These messages can activate stereotypes and
prejudicial attitudes in people's cognitive structures that influence
subsequent behavior.1 6 One study, for example, demonstrated that
after being primed with advertisements that portrayed women as
sex objects, male participants obtained more stereotypical
information about women job applicants during an interview and
engaged in more sexualized behavior toward the women in the
interview."' Another study found that after subliminally priming
individuals with the concept of career woman, participants were
more likely to believe that a neutral target woman had the
stereotypical attributes of career women. In another study,
women who were primed with traditional gender roles were more
likely to associate men's names with power-related words and
115. See generally, e.g., John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior.- Direct
Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 230 (1996).
116. See generally Russell H. Fazio & Michael A. Olson, Implicit Measures in Social
Cognition Research: Their Meaning and Use, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 297, 305-07, 313
(2003); Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:
Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995).
117. Laurie A. Rudman & Eugene Borgida, The Afterglow of Construct
Accessibility: The Behavioral Consequences of Priming Men to View Women as Sex Objects,
31J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 493, 503, 506-08 (1995).
118. Lisa Irmen, Automatic Activation and Use of Gender Subgroups, 55 SEx ROLES
435, 439-40 (2006).
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women's names with warmth-related words." 9 Other studies have
shown that exposing participants to either stereotypically male or
female roles resulted in the false recognition of stereotypically
gendered roles and traits in a subsequent task, 120 that priming
individuals with stereotypes about black criminals led to decreased
support for welfare policies that would benefit black victims of
Hurricane Katrina, 12 and that priming individuals with the sense
that their own decision making was objective and unbiased made
them more likely to engage in gender discrimination in hiring."'
Taken together, these findings demonstrate the power of priming
in shaping stereotyping and discrimination behavior. Individuals
who are exposed to certain concepts in their surroundings, even
outside of conscious awareness, can become more likely to utilize
these concepts in subsequent decisions and tasks. This research
suggests that individuals are not always equally likely to express the
stereotypes that they hold; stereotyping and discrimination depend
on what kinds of concepts are salient in the immediate social
context. Rates of FRD from a particular supervisor may depend on
the extent to which traditional gender roles and stereotypes are
primed by the individuals' surroundings.
As the findings summarized in this Part demonstrate,
individuals who hold stereotypes and prejudices against certain
groups in society are not always equally likely to express these
stereotypes or engage in discrimination. Discriminatory conduct
can be influenced by many features of the immediate social
context, including: structural constraints that limit an individual's
ability to mask discriminatory acts; self-esteem and other
motivations that determine how an individual strategically uses
stereotypes of others; the extent to which an individual feels
morally credentialed enough to justify discrimination; the
availability of cognitive, physical, and self-regulatory resources; and
119. Laurie A. Rudman & Julie E. Phelan, The Effect of Priming Gender Roles on
Women's Implicit Gender Beliefs and Career Aspirations, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 192, 196-98
(2010).
120. Allison P. Lenton et al., Illusions of Gender: Stereotypes Evoke False Memories,
37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 3, 11 (2001).
121. James D. Johnson et al., Priming Media Stereotypes Reduces Support for Social
Welfare Policies: The Mediating Role of Empathy, 35 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 463, 472 (2009).
122. Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, "I Think It, Therefore It's True"
Effects of Self-Perceived Objectivity on Hiring Discrimination, 104 ORG. BEIHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 207, 218 (2007).
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the concepts and stereotypes that an individual is exposed to by his1. 123
or her surroundings. To situate these findings in the context
of FRD, this research suggests that although a supervisor's
discriminatory acts against employees with family responsibilities
likely stem from the supervisor's relatively stable stereotypes and
prejudices, it does not follow that the supervisor will act on those
stereotypes and prejudices in every case. The situational context
surrounding the supervisor will influence whether he or she is able
and motivated to express stereotypes and engage in discriminatory
behavior against employees with family responsibilities. The next
portion of this Article discusses the same-actor inference, which
relies on assumptions that are directly contradicted by these
insights from social psychology. It also addresses the improper use
of the same-actor inference to dismiss FRD cases that have merit.
III. THE SAME-ACTOR INFERENCE
A significant aspect of judges' and fact-finders' jobs involves
making assertions and assumptions about human psychology and
behavior."' When judges' theories about human behavior are
consistent with empirical reality, judges are in a position to make
decisions that further justice and the goals of public policy. When
judges' theories about human behavior are inaccurate, however,
they can inadvertently cause significant harm to the parties and to
society as a whole. 25 Because human psychology and behavior are
so integral to the law, some scholars argue for a "psychological
123. Social psychological research also demonstrates that many forms of
stereotyping and discrimination take place outside of an individual's complete
awareness and control. Several scholars have made strong cases for the relevance
of these forms of discrimination for law and policy, so this Article will not
duplicate those efforts here. See generally, e.g., John T. Jost et al., The Existence of
Implicit Bias Is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological
Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies that No Manager Should Ignore, 29 REs.
ORGANIzATIoNAL BEHAV. 39 (2009); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom,
59 UCLA L. REv. 1124 (2012); Krieger & Fiske, supra note 64; Brian A. Nosek &
Rachel G. Riskind, Policy Implications of Implicit Social Cognition, 6 Soc. ISSUES &
POL'y Rv. 113 (2012). It is worth pointing out that the existence of implicit biases
and discrimination makes it even clearer that the courts' traditional
understanding of how discrimination works is severely divorced from reality.
124. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 64, at 997-98.
125. Krieger, supra note 11, at 836; Krieger & Fiske, supra note 64, at 998-99.
See generally BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
(Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008).
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jurisprudence"; psychological jurisprudence aims to "make legal
assumptions about human nature as consistent with contemporary
psychological knowledge as possible, that is, to close the gap
between folk and scientific theories of the person.'.. 6 To that end,
it is important that judges and fact-finders deciding FRD cases
clearly understand how gender stereotyping and discrimination
127really operate.
There is currently no federal statute that defines caregivers as
a protected class."" In other words, there is no FRD cause of action
per se. In order to succeed in a claim under federal law or most
states' laws, a plaintiff must fit FRD under another cause of action.
At the federal level, successful FRD cases have arisen under several
different statutes, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Tide VII), the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Employment Pay Act
(EPA), and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA). 12 Title VII provides plaintiffs the most flexibility in the
types of legal theories that are available to them.30 Title VII also
covers more employers than the FMLA and other statutes.131
Therefore, plaintiffs are in the most advantageous position if they
126. Tom R. Tyler & John T.Jost, Psychology and the Law: Reconciling Normative
and Descriptive Accounts of Social Justice and System Legitimacy, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY:
HANDBOOK OF BASIc PRINCIPLES 807, 808 (A.W. Kruglanski & E.T. Higgins eds.,
2d ed. 2007), available at http://www.psych.nyu.edu/jost/Tyler%20&%20Jost
%20(2007) %20Psychology%20and%20the%201aw.pdf.
127. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 64, at 1000.
128. Steven I. Locke, Family Responsibilities Discrimination and the New York City
Model: A Map forFuture Legislation, 51 S. TEX. L. REv. 19, 29 (2009). A few states and
several dozen local governments recognize parental or caregiver status as a
protected class for discrimination purposes. Joan C. Williams & Stephanie
Bornstein, The Evolution of "FRED": Family Responsibilities Discrimination and
Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1346
(2008).
129. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 8, at 181-82.
130. Id. at 182-85 (stating that cases have been brought under "disparate
treatment or gender discrimination ... hostile work environment, harassment,
constructive discharge, and retaliation").
131. The FM[A covers employers with fifty or more employees within seventy-
five miles of the worksite; furthermore, employees must be employed for at least
twelve months by the employer and work at least 1250 hours to be covered by the
FMLA. Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2012). In
contrast, Title VII covers all employers with fifteen or more employees. Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
2015] 1053
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss3/10
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
can make the case that the FRD they experienced was based on sex
for the purposes of Title VII.
As discussed above in Part II, FRD is rooted in traditional
descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes about the proper roles of
men and women in the workplace and the home.131 As such, FRD is
discrimination based on sex for the purposes of Title VII,"' as well
as other employment discrimination statutes that define sex or
gender as protected classes. 11 4 The United States Supreme Court
has made clear that making employment decisions on the basis of
descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes about gender is a violation
135of Title VII. Because caregiving and career roles are integral parts
of descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes about men and136 "~
women, 16 FRD falls squarely in the category of discrimination
covered by Title VII. Furthermore, plaintiffs' reliance on
comparator evidence13 in FRD cases has decreased in recent years;
132. See supra Part II.B. 1.
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (making it an unlawful employment
practice to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's.., sex"); id.
§ 2000e-2(a) (2) (making it an unlawful employment practice "to limit, segregate,
or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
... sex").
134. See, e.g., Minnesota Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. § 363A.08, subdiv. 2
(2012) (making it an unfair employment practice "for an employer, because of...
sex . . . to: (1) refuse to hire or to maintain a system of employment which
unreasonably excludes a person seeking employment; or (2) discharge an
employee; or (3) discriminate against a person with respect to hiring, tenure,
compensation, terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or privileges of
employment"). Sex discrimination claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act
utilize the same legal principles as those under Title VII. Saulsberry v. St. Mary's
Univ. of Minn., 318 F.3d 862, 866 (8th Cir. 2003).
135. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-51 (1989) ("In the
specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief
that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis
of gender. . . . [W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated
with their group .... ."); see also Stephanie Bornstein, The Legal and Policy
Implications of the "Flexibility Stigma, " 69J. Soc. ISSUEs 389, 389-91 (2013).
136. See supra Part II.B.1.
137. Comparator evidence is evidence showing that an individual who is
similarly situated to the plaintiff (in all relevant ways except for the plaintiff's
protected class) received different treatment from the plaintiff. See BLACK's LAw
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instead, more and more plaintiffs are proving their cases using
evidence of gender stereotyping. "s Accordingly, the need for
judges to understand psychological theories of stereotyping and
discrimination is growing. Unfortunately, judges' lay understanding
of FRD, and of gender biases more broadly, has been inconsistent
and often inaccurate. A major consequence has been the
problematic use of the same-actor inference in FRDjurisprudence.
A. The Same-Actor Inference Is Empirically Invalid
The same-actor inference is rooted in fundamental
misunderstandings on the part of judges and fact-finders that
directly contradict social psychological evidence. The remainder of
this Part will describe the same-actor inference and discuss the
extent to which it has been invalidated by social psychology.
1. The McDonnell-Douglas Burden-Shifting Framework
FRD and other discrimination cases under Title VII are
analyzed using the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework.'39
This approach follows three stages of analysis. First, the plaintiff
must make a prima facie case of discrimination, using direct or
circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory motive. To make a
prima facie case, plaintiffs must show that: 1) they are members of
a protected class under Title VII; 2) they met the employer's
legitimate expectations for job performance; 3) they suffered an
adverse employment action; and 4) the circumstances give rise to
an inference of discrimination based on the protected class status,
such as sex.'4' If the plaintiff successfully makes a prima facie case
in the first stage, the burden shifts to the defendant employer to
present a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
actions taken against the employee.4 2 If the employer satisfies this
DIcTIONARY 342 (10th ed. 2014). The comparison allows the courts to infer that
the differential treatment was based on the plaintiff's protected class, which makes
the prima facie case for discrimination. Cuevas v. Am. Express Travel Related
Servs. Co., 256 F. App'x 241, 243 (11th Cir. 2007).
138. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 8, at 188.
139. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973); see also
Carter v. Dayton Rogers Mfg. Co., 543 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1033 (D. Minn. 2008).
140. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
141. See id.
142. Id.
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burden, the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate
that the non-discriminatory reason offered by the employer was
mere pretext for discrimination."' The first two stages of the
McDonnell-Douglas analysis are relatively easy for the parties to
satisfy.'4" As a result, most of the legal battle takes place in the third
stage of analysis, in which the plaintiff must show that the
employer's reasons for taking the adverse action are mere pretext
for discrimination. 5 This stage is also where the same-actor
inference comes into play. 146
2. The Same-Actor Inference
The same-actor inference was first articulated in 1991 by the
Fourth Circuit.147 In 1985, Warren Proud was fired from his job less
than five months after having been hired. Proud brought suit for
age discrimination uinder the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA).1 49 The court ruled that, because Proud had been fired
by the same man who hired him in the first place, age could not
have been a motivating factor in Proud's termination. The court
reasoned that "it hardly makes sense to hire workers from a group
one dislikes (thereby incurring the psychological costs of
associating with them), only to fire them once they are on the
job. ,1' The court believed, in other words, that an individual with a
particular prejudice would express that prejudice at every
opportunity; the fact that he or she did not express that prejudice at
a particular time in the past must mean that he or she does not
hold the 5prejudice at all and could not have discriminated in the
present.
143. Id. at 804.
144. SeeNatasha Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 Mo. L. REv. 313, 366 (2010).
145. Id. at 365.
146. Id.
147. Anna Laurie Bryant & Richard A. Bales, Using the Same Actor "Inference" in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 255, 256 (1999) (citing Proud v.
Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991)).
148. Proud, 945 F.2d at 796-97.
149. Id. at 797; see also 29 U.S.C. § 633a (2012).
150. Proud, 945 F.2d at 797.
151. Id. (quotingJohnJ. Donohue & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 1017 (1991)).
152. See id.
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The Proud court then articulated the same-actor inference:
"[I]n cases where the hirer and the firer are the same individual
and the termination of employment occurs within a relatively short
time span following the hiring, a strong inference exists that
discrimination was not a determining factor for the adverse action
taken by the employer.' ' 53 This inference comes into play in the
third stage of the McDonnell-Douglas analysis described above.1 54 The
plaintiff argues that the explanation the employer has offered for
the adverse employment action is merely pretextual and that the
action was instead motivated by discrimination.155 The same-actor
evidence brought by the defendant employer creates a "strong
inference that the employer's stated reason for acting against the
employee is not pretextual,', 15" and the plaintiff must overcome this
inference.
The Proud court's original articulation of the same-actor
inference was relatively narrow; it only applied to cases in which
there was a hiring and a firing, the hirer and the firer were the
same actor, the target of the hiring and firing was the same Person,
and the firing took place a short time after the hiring. This
confluence of factors represents a limited subset of potential
discrimination cases. In Proud, the "relatively short time span"
S 158
between hiring and termination was under six months.' Since
Proud, courts have expanded this time span considerably and used
the same-actor inference in cases in which seven years passed
between hiring and termination. 5 9 Subsequent courts have also
applied the same-actor inference to cases in which the adverse
employment action was not termination.'6' One example is
Richmond v. Johnson, in which the plaintiff was denied a promotion
by the same supervisor who had promoted her approximately one
153. Id.
154. Martin, supra note 144, at 365.
155. Id. at 365-66.
156. Proud, 945 F.2d at 798.
157. See id. at 797; Natasha T. Martin, Immunity for Hire: How the Same-Actor
Doctrine Sustains Discrimination in the Contemporary Workplace, 40 CONN. L. REv. 1117,
1134 (2008).
158. Proud, 945 F.2d at 797.
159. Bryant & Bales, supra note 147, at 274; Martin, supra note 157, at 1135;
see, e.g., Adreani v. First Colonial Bankshares Corp., 154 F.3d 389, 392 (7th Cir.
1998); Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 1995).
160. See, e.g., Bryant & Bales, supra note 147, at 273-74.
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year earlier." ' Shortly before denying plaintiff the promotion, the
plaintiffs supervisor asked her, "[W]hat? Are you pregnant?"'62
Despite this evidence of discrimination, the circuit court
determined that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext and
discrimination did not overcome the same-actor inference, and the
court upheld summary judgment for the employer. 63 Thus,
although the Proud court initially envisioned a narrow set of
circumstances under which the same-actor inference would apply,
courts have continued to broaden the same-actor principle nearly
beyond recognition. Particularly troubling is the way courts have
expanded the principle to situations that do not involve the same
actor doing the hiring and firing.' 64 Indeed, the name "same-actor
inference" seems a misnomer given its current usage by courts. The
next sections will analyze the ways in which the same-actor
inference has been expanded in scope and its various uses in FRD
165cases.
3. Extensions of the Same-Actor Inference
The same-actor inference originally applied only to situations
in which-across a positive employment action (i.e., hiring) and an
adverse action (i.e., firing)-there was only one actor and one
target.16 Since Proud, courts have broadened the scope of the
inference considerably, so that different actors and different targetsinfeenceconsderaly, 167
of actions may be involved. The remainder of this section will
discuss cases that involve (1) the same actor taking both the
positive employment action and the adverse action, but toward
different targets; (2) multiple actors taking actions toward the same
target; and (3) an actor and a target who belong to the same
protected class. Although the same-actor inference now takes many
different forms, 68 the same underlying logic and fundamental
161. Richmond v.Johnson, No. 96-6329, 1997 WL 809962, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec.
18, 1997).
162. Id.
163. Id. at *2.
164. SeeMartin, supra note 157, at 1136.
165. Although Proud was an age discrimination case, courts also apply same-
actor reasoning in sex discrimination cases. See, e.g., Buhrmaster v. Overnite
Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 1995).
166. Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991).
167. See Martin, supra note 157, at 1133-34.
168. Sometimes courts do not explicitly state that they are utilizing the same-
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misunderstandings of how stereotyping and discrimination operate
underlie each of these versions of the same-actor inference.
a. Same Actor, Different Target
The first extension of the same-actor inference involves cases
in which the same actor takes a positive employment action toward,
and an adverse action against, two employees of the same protected
class. This might occur, for example, when a supervisor promotes
one employee of a particular protected class and terminates
another employee in that class.' f'9 In this case, the court might infer
that because the supervisor promoted the first employee, the
supervisor must not harbor any discriminatory animus toward the
protected class, and the termination of the second employee must
not have been motivated by discrimination. Another example
might involve a supervisor who fires one employee and rePlaces
him or her with an employee from the same protected class.
Tom Hayden is one example of a plaintiff whose FRD case
under Title VII was inappropriately disposed of in summary
judgment when the court extended the same-actor inference in this
way. When Hayden requested FMLA leave to care for his wife and
newborn baby, a human resources officer questioned his request,
stating, "It's very strange that we have a male manager request that
amount of time off[;] we have never had that before."'7 2 Hayden's
request for leave was initially granted, but he was fired one week
later.113 Hayden's employer then replaced him with another man.
7 4
Hayden sued under both the FMLA and Title VII, but his Title VII
claim was defeated. 115 The court declared that because Hayden was
replaced by another man, a member of the same protected class,
he could not make a case for sex discrimination under Title VII.
176
actor inference or an extension of it. See, e.g., Hayden v. Garden Ridge Mgmt.,
LLC, Civil Action No. 4:08cv172, 2009 WL 5196718, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 22,
2009).
169. See, e.g., id.
170. SeeMartin, supra note 157, at 1137.
171. See Hayden, 2009 WL 5196718, at *5.
172. Id. at *4.
173. Id. at *1.
174. Id. at *5.
175. Id. at *3, *5.
176. Id. at *3.
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The court granted summary judgment on the Title VII claims for
Hayden's employer.77
The human resource manager's comment in this case strongly
suggests that Hayden was fired because he did not fit in with
prescriptive stereotypes that push men to devote all of their time to
the workplace and leave domestic work to women. However, the
court felt that this evidence could not overcome the strong
presumption that, because Hayden's employer hired a man, the
employer simply was not prejudiced against men and would not
terminate a man on the basis of sex discrimination. 18 This
misguided understanding of discrimination relies on the faulty
logic that an individual who discriminates against members of a
particular class does so in every situation; it fails to recognize
the highly context-dependent nature of stereotyping and
discrimination. Contrary to the Hayden court's view, taking adverse
employment actions against the subset of men who have caregiving
responsibilities is sex discrimination. Hayden should have had the
opportunity to present his case at trial.
b. Multiple Actors, Same Target
The second extension of the same-actor inference involves
cases in which multiple actors take positive and adverse actions
against the same target employee. 79 This might happen, for
example, in a workplace with a relatively large managerial team,
where multiple supervisors have input into decisions about the
employees. 8A typical case of this type usually involves a committee
of supervisors, only one of which has taken a positive action toward
the employee, or a supervisor that gets input about the employer's181
performance from another colleague. A court in this case might
177. Id.
178. Id. ("According to the uncontroverted evidence, Plaintiff was replaced by
another male . . .so he cannot show he was replaced by someone outside his
protected class, and his gender discrimination claim therefore fails.").
179. Martin, supra note 157, at 1136.
180. See id.
181. See, e.g., Wofford v. Middletown Tube Works, Inc., 67 F. App'x 312, 318
(6th Cir. 2003) ("[T] he fact that the same... group of people did both the hiring
and firing. . . is strong evidence that there was no discrimination involved ....");
Sreeram v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 188 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 1999)
(discussing review by committee); Nieto v. L&H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 624
(5th Cir. 1997) (discussing conversations between supervising officers regarding
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infer that because at least one supervisor has taken a positive action
toward the employee, the group of supervisors as a whole must not
have been motivated by discrimination in its adverse action. This
view implicitly regards the multiple supervisors who had input into
the employee's fate as one actor; if at least one of those supervisors
behaved in a non-discriminatory way in the past, the courts are
skeptical that any of the supervisors would engage in discrimination
in the present.
Dr. Suha Sreeram is one plaintiff whose FRD case was
dismissed when the court relied on this type of logic. 182 Dr. Sreeram
was the only woman in her surgical residency cohort, and she was
expelled from the residency program after completing three
years."" Despite the fact that Dr. Sreeram scored very high on
objective measures of performance, such as exams, her Residency
Review Committee felt that she had difficulties in other areas, such
as decisively applying her knowledge to diagnose patients.""
Evidence of gender stereotyping and FRD against Dr. Sreeram
abound in this case. One of the doctors on the Committee, Dr.
McDonald, repeatedly asked Dr. Sreeram whether her perceived
deficiencies were "cultural.'' 15 In Dr. McDonald's deposition, he
explained that he meant that he felt Indian women were "not as
assertive as their American counterparts," and that he "wondered if
a part of this problem was not a lack of assertiveness, that she did
not act independently and assertively in her day-to-day work."'
186
Another doctor on the Committee, Dr. Spires, "testified that he
had concerns about why women would put themselves through a
surgical residency, especially if they are planning on having• ,,187
children. He stated:
[T]hey're constantly tired, and they don't have time to
put on their makeup and put on clothes and do a lot of
the things girls need to do, and it[']s difficult. ... [I]f she
got particular pleasure and was particularly efficient in
surgery... I'm sure she could find a way to work children
an employee's performance);Jean-Baptiste v. K-Z, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 2d 652, 664
(N.D. Ind. 2006) (discussing a "mosaic" of workplace hostility).
182. See Sreeram, 188 F.3d at 314.
183. Id. at 316-17.
184. Id. at 317, 319.
185. Id. at 319 n.I.
186. Id.
187. Id.
2015] 1061
30
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss3/10
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
and a two career marriage, and that sort of thing out
okay. 188
In analyzing this evidence, the court focused on the fact that
one of the doctors on the Committee (Dr. McDonald) had granted
Dr. Sreeram's request to stay in the residency program for an
additional yJear after the Committee had recommended her
expulsion. Despite the fact that only one member of the
committee had taken this favorable employment action toward Dr.
Sreeram, and despite the fact that this member had himself made
sexist comments, the court found that this was "overwhelming
evidence corroborating defendants' non-discriminatory. ,190
rationale. The court dismissed the egregiously sexist statements
as "stray remarks" that could not overcome the presumption of
non-discrimination stemming from this same-actor evidence,'9 ' and
it affirmed summary judgment for Dr. Sreeram's employer. 92
The remarks about Dr. Sreeram's culture and inability to be
assertive are clear examples of descriptive stereotyping "M of women
in the workplace; Dr. McDonald felt that women (of certain
national origins) simply were not agentic and assertive enough to
be doctors, and he perceived Dr. Sreeram's performance through
this lens.' 94 The comments about Dr. Sreeram's ability to have
children and complete a surgical residency99 are clear examples of
prescriptive stereotypes 96 that demand that women prioritize
caregiving over their careers. It is not even clear from the record
whether Dr. Sreeram had children or planned to have children;' 97
188. Id.
189. Id. at 321.
190. Id. at 320. Notably, the court also relegated all of this evidence of
discrimination to a footnote instead of presenting these facts in the body of the
opinion. See id. at 322 n.1.
191. Id. at 320.
192. Id. at 322.
193. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
194. Sreeram, 188 F.3d at 319 n.1.
195. Id.
196. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
197. See Sreeram, 188 F.3d at 316-17. But cf Original Brief on Behalf of
Plaintiff/Appellant at 15, Sreeram v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 188
F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-31183), 1998 WL 34085800, at *15 (noting that
Dr. Spires asked Dr. Sreeram "why she wanted to be a surgeon if she was going to
have children"). It is important to note, however, that Dr. Spire's question
assuming Dr. Sreeram would have children is no indication in the record of Dr.
Sreeram's actual decision to have children. If anything, such a question without
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Dr. Spires simply assumed that because Dr. Sreeram was a woman,
she would be too consumed by family concerns to fully devote
herself to her job. Unfortunately, this evidence of descriptive and
prescriptive stereotyping was not enough to overcome the
presumption that because a single doctor on the Committee had, , . 198
delayed Dr. Sreeram's expulsion, he must not have harbored any
sex-based prejudice, and the rest of the Committee must therefore
have acted without prejudice as well.'"
c. Actor and Target in the Same Protected Class
The third extension of the same-actor inference involves cases
in which the actor is a member of the same protected class as the
target employee. 2°° This might occur, for example, if a female
manager terminates a female employee, or a male supervisor
denies a male employee parental leave. In this situation, some
courts infer that the actor could not hold any discriminatory
animus toward members of his or her own protected class and that
the actor's adverse action could not therefore be motivated by
discrimination. This presumption is frequently employed in sex
discrimination cases under Title VII.20' However, social
psychological research has established that both men and women
are capable of engaging in stereotyping, prejudice, and
further factual findings suggests that Dr. Spire was in fact employing gender
stereotypes.
198. See Sreeram, 188 F.3d at 321 ("Dr. McDonald . ..granted [Sreeram's]
request to stay in the program for another year despite . . . recommendation [s]
that her residency be terminated.").
199. See id. at 321-22.
200. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 157, at 1137-38.
201. See, e.g., James v. Verizon, 792 F. Supp. 2d 861, 869-70 (D. Md. 2011)
("'[P]roof that the decision-maker is a member of the same protected class as
Jackson weakens any possible inference of discrimination."' (quoting Jackson v.
Sch. Bd. of Richmond, No. 99-CV-642, 2000 WL 34292578, at *7 (E.D. Va. Mar. 15,
2000))); Vernon v. A & L Motor Sales, No. 07-1508, 2009 WL 866851, at *5 (W.D.
Pa. Mar. 30, 2009) ("[T]hat Plaintiff was hired by a woman, fired by a woman and
replaced by a woman belies the notion that the circumstances surrounding her
termination were discriminatory."); Aceto v. Town of Bloomfield, Civil No.
3:04CV01977(AWT), 2006 WL 1405579, at *5 (D. Conn. May 19, 2006) ("A well-
recognized inference against discrimination exists where the person who
participated in the allegedly adverse decision is also a member of the same
protected class.") .
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S 202discrimination against other members of their genders. Thus,
there is no empirical basis for the assumption that discrimination
has not occurred, simply because the actor and target are members
of the same protected class.
The same-actor inference has evolved significantly since itsn 203
original conception in Proud, becoming "fully entrenched in
workplace [discrimination] law."04 Courts now rely on the same-
actor inference in FRD cases that involve a wide variety of
205circumstances. Every circuit now uses some form of the same-
actor inference in discrimination cases, notwithstanding the fact
that this type of inference appears to conflict with the United States
Supreme Court's ruling in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,r 207
Inc. The circuits do not all give the same-actor inference equal
weight, but in the majority of circuits, the same-actor inference
amounts to an "insurmountable challenge" for a large number of• • 208
plaintiffs. Indeed, the Proud court
was not simply holding that the fact that the same person
who made the decision to fire Mr. Proud had earlier
made the decision to hire him was probative of whether
Mr. Proud's age influenced the firing decision and
202. See generally Peter Glick & Susan Fiske, An Ambivalent Alliance: Hostile and
Benevolent Sexism as Complementary Justifications for Gender Inequality, 56 AM. PSYCHOL.
109 (2001); John T. Jost & Aaron Kay, Exposure to Benevolent Sexism and
Complementary Gender Stereotypes: Consequences for Speciflc and Diffuse Forms of System
Justification, 88J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 498 (2005).
203. See generally Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991)
(articulating the same-actor inference: "[I]n cases where the hirer and the firer
are the same individual and the termination of employment occurs within a
relatively short time span following the hiring, a strong inference exists that
discrimination was not a determining factor for the adverse action taken by the
employer").
204. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 157, at 1121.
205. See, e.g., Hayden v. Garden Ridge Mgmt., LLC, Civil Action No.
4:08CV1 72, 2009 WL 5196718, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2009); see also Miller, supra
note 12, at 360-61.
206. Martin, supra note 157, at 1128.
207. 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000); see Martin, supra note 144, at 379-80. See
generally Charles F. Thompson, Jr., Juries Will Decide More Discrimination Cases: An
Examination of Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 26 VT. L. REv. 1, 41-
42 (2001) (predicting, seemingly incorrectly, that the Reeves decision would cause
courts to stop relying on shortcuts such as the same-actor inference to dismiss
discrimination cases on summaryjudgment).
208. Martin, supra note 157, at 1121.
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was therefore admissible to disprove discriminatory
motivation. Rather, the Fourth Circuit in [Proud] found
this fact is so probative that it relieved the court of the
need to examine any of the other evidence bearing on the
209)issue of discriminatory motivation .
In contrast to the Proud court's view, social psychological
evidence regarding stereotyping and discrimination calls into
question whether same-actor evidence is at all probative in the
context of FRD cases.2 '0 The next Part will analyze the ways in which
evidence from social psychology challenges the use of the same-
actor inference in FRD cases.
4. The Same-Actor Inference Has Been Invalidated by Social
Psychological Evidence
As discussed above, the faulty logic underlying the same-actor
inference is that if an individual harbors prejudice against a
protected class, he or she will engage in discrimination againstS 211
members of that class at every opportunity. Courts frequently
infer from past incidents of non-discrimination against a particular
class that discrimination must not have occurred in the present
212situation. However, decades of social psychological research
make clear that this is simply not how stereotyping and
discrimination operate.2 l3 The fact that a party appears not to have
discriminated at one point in the past is not evidence of a lack of
discriminatory motive in the present. Parts (a) through (d) in the
remainder of this section will discuss how each of the four versions
of the same-actor inference (the original same-actor inference and
its three variations) are called into question by social psychological
findings.
209. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 64, at 1044 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
210. See supra Part III.B.
211. See supra Part III.A.1-4.
212. See supra Part III.A. 1-3.
213. See Erik J. Girvan & Grace Deason, Social Science in Law: A Psychological
Case for Abandoning the "Discriminatory Motive" Under Title VII, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REv.
1057, 1091-92 (2013) (stating that the assumptions underlying the same-actor
inference are flawed); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup
Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REv. 1251, 1314-16 (1998) (pointing
out that the same-actor inference is flawed because it is "simply not how
discrimination works"); see also supra Part III.B.
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a. Same Actor, Same Target
When an actor takes a positive employment action toward an
employee before the same actor takes an adverse action toward that
employee, courts impose a strong presumption that the adverse
214action was not motivated by discriminatory animus. However,
social psychological research has revealed many reasons why an
actor may have hired or promoted the employee in the first place,
none of which weaken the inference that the adverse action was
215
discriminatory.
First, the circumstances surrounding an employee's family
responsibilities sometimes can change during employment. Recall
that descriptive stereotypes about women as lacking in agency,
competence, and commitment are sometimes triggered when a
woman announces she is pregnant or activates maternal concepts
in some other way.216 In Richmond v. Johnson, for example, the
plaintiff was denied a promotion not long after her supervisor
217mistakenly thought she was pregnant. It is perfectly plausible,
given the social psychological findings, that Richmond's supervisor
believed that she may soon become pregnant, and he therefore
began to view her as less competent and committed than he did
before. This theory would easily explain why that same supervisor
had promoted Richmond one year earlier, before the possibility of
218
pregnancy had been raised.
Second, even in circumstances in which the employee already
has family responsibilities at the start of his or her employment, it
can be the case that the supervisor deems the employee fit for some
positions within the company and not others. If this belief is based
on stereotypes about the proper roles of men and women, this kind
of conduct is FRD. 2 ' 9 For example, in Lust v. Sealy, Inc., the
plaintiffs supervisor passed her over for a promotion because he
assumed that because she had children, she would not be
214. E.g., Richmond v. Johnson, No. 96-6329, 1997 WL 809962, at *2 (6th Cir.
Dec. 18, 1997); Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991).
215. See supra Part II.B.2.
216. See Heilman, supra note 41, at 658.
217. Richmond, 1997 WL 809962, at *1.
218. See id.
219. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 8, at 171 (defining FRD as
discrimination against an individual because of his or her real or perceived
caregiving responsibilities).
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• 220interested in a job position that required her to relocate. The
supervisor was willing to hire Lust for a certain type of job, but later
failed to promote her to a different job on the basis of his own
gender stereotypes. This is a clear example of how an actor's
previous hiring of an employee in no way indicates that the actor's
subsequent adverse actions are non-discriminatory.
Third, social psychological research makes clear that
discrimination is context dependent. 22' The fact that an actor
engages in non-discrimination in the first instance does not mean
that the second instance is non-discriminatory. It could be the case
that structural constraints made it difficult for the actor to
22discriminate the first time around. For example, depending on
which employees are being considered for a promotion and what
their qualifications are, it might be obvious that the actor is
discriminating on the basis of sex and potential family
responsibilities. There may not be individuating information that
the actor can rely on to mask the discriminatory nature of the
221
choice.
Research has also demonstrated that engaging in non-
discriminatory behavior may sometimes increase the probability that
an individual discriminates in the future. 22 After a supervisor has
expressed disagreement with sexist statements, or hired or
promoted an employee with family responsibilities, the supervisor
may feel morally credentialed and become more likely to engage in
225subsequent discrimination against the same employee.
Supervisors may even engage in non-discriminatory behavior at first
in order to strategically build up moral credentials and subjectively
226free themselves to engage in discrimination later.
220. Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004).
221. See supra Part II.B.2.
222. See Hilton & von Hippel, supra note 35, at 255-56; Kunda & Spencer,
supra note 67, at 538, 540.
223. See Darley & Gross, supra note 70, at 28; Hodson et al., supra note 70, at
469; Snyder et al., supra note 68, at 2303-04.
224. See supra Part II.B.2. See generally Monin & Miller, supra note 89, at 37
(suggesting that "a decision that favors one minority member (even if it is totally
deserved) is sufficient to liberate people to act on an attitude (often based mainly
on prejudice) that is detrimental for other minority members").
225. See Effron et al., supra note 95, at 928; Kouchaki, supra note 96, at 713;
Monin & Miller, supra note 89, at 35.
226. See Merritt et al., supra note 98, at 774-76.
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Finally, the research establishes that it takes cognitive, physical,
and self-regulatory resources to inhibit otherwise habitual
discriminatory responses.227 It could be the case that a supervisor is
able to inhibit discriminatory responses the first time he or she
takes an action regarding the employee, but operates under
cognitive load or reduced self-regulatory resources the secondS 228
time. This example would easily explain why the same supervisor
discriminated against the employee only in the most recent case.
Taken together, the social psychological research on
stereotyping and discrimination makes clear that discrimination is
a context-dependent process. The fact that a supervisor took a
positive action toward a given employee in the past is simply not
evidence that his or her subsequent adverse action against the
employee was non-discriminatory.
b. Same Actor, Different Target
When an actor takes a positive action toward one member of a
protected class and an adverse action toward another member of
the same class, courts impose a strong presumption that the
adverse action was not motivated by discriminatory animus.
2 29
However, social psychological research reveals many reasons why a
supervisor might treat one member of the protected class favorably;
this treatment does not weaken the inference that the adverse
action against the other member of the class was discriminatory.
First, it could be the case that members of the same class differ in
their family responsibilities. Recall Hayden v. Garden Ridge
Management, LLC, for example, in which the plaintiff was fired
shortly after he requested FMLA leave to take care of his newborn
baby. 23 The court inferred that because another man replaced
Hayden, Hayden's employer clearly did not harbor prejudice
against men."' The research indicates, however, that penalties for
men who engage in caregiving behavior are based in prescriptive
227. See supra Part II.B.2.
228. See, e.g., Martell, supra note 105, at 1950; Perry et al., supra note 106, at
638; Sczesny & Kfihnen, supra note 108, at 18.
229. See, e.g., Hayden v. Garden Ridge Mgmt., LLC, Civil Action No.
4:08CV172, 2009 WL 5196718, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2009). For a discussion of
Hayden, see supra Part III.A.3.a.
230. Hayden, 2009 WL 5196718, at *1.
231. Id. at *5.
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S• 232stereotypes about the proper role of men in the workplace.
Terminating men who violate gender norms by engaging in
caregiving and hiring men who adhere to these norms is FRD.
Second, the research establishes that discrimination is context
dependent. The fact that an actor treats one member of a
protected class favorably does not mean that conduct toward a
second member is non-discriminatory. For example, people
sometimes strategically make use of stereotypes and engage in
discrimination depending on their motivations in a given
231situation. It is perfectly plausible that an individual who holds
stereotypes and prejudices about individuals with family
responsibilities might inhibit discriminatory conduct when
properly motivated to do so. Conversely, the motivation to restore
self-esteem, to give just one example, might lead a supervisor to
denigrate one member of a protected class. Research on moral
credentials might also explain this situation. A supervisor who has
treated one member of a protected class favorably might feel
morally credentialed enough to discriminate against another
216member.
Finally, social psychological research on priming indicates that
stereotyping and discrimination can vary over time as a function of
what concepts the individual is exposed to in the immediate
environment. A supervisor who is primed with stereotypical
portrayals regarding a protected class may temporarily become
232. CENTER FOR WoRKLIFE LAW, supra note 25, at 20-21; Williams & Tait,
supra note 38, at 865-69.
233. See Berdahl & Moon, supra note 61, at 358-59 ("Men who violated
traditional gender roles by actively caring for children outside the home, in
contrast, experienced more workplace mistreatment than men who did not
actively care for children."); Coltrane et al., supra note 40, at 297-98 ("[M]en who
opt for a 'daddy track,' by choosing flexible work trajectories suffer lower long-
term earning."); Rudman & Mescher, supra note 40, at 335-36 ("[M]ale leave
requesters suffered feminity stigma, such that perceivers judged them as weaker
and more communal ....... ); Vandello et al., supra note 40, at 315-16
("[M]anagers are most likely to grant flextime to men who seek flexible
arrangements specifically for the purpose of advancing their careers (as opposed
to child caregiving).").
234. See, e.g., Kunda et al., supra note 82, at 295; see also Sinclair & Kunda,
supra note 82, at 1340.
235. See, e.g., Kunda et al., supra note 82, at 295; see also Sinclair & Kunda,
supra note 82, at 1340.
236. See Effron et al., supra note 95, at 928; see also Kouchaki, supra note 96, at
713; Monin & Miller, supra note 89, at 35.
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more likely to discriminate against members of that class.23 7 This
priming could lead the supervisor to treat one member of the class
favorably but, in a different situation, to discriminate against
another member of the class. Despite being context sensitive, this
type of discrimination would still be rooted in the stereotypes and
prejudices that existed in the supervisor's cognitive structure.
Taken together, social psychological research on stereotyping and
discrimination makes clear that a supervisor's positive treatment of
one member of a protected class does not render all conduct
toward other members of that class non-discriminatory.
c. Multiple Actors, Same Target
When an organization with multiple actors takes a positive
action toward an employee and then later takes an adverse action
against that employee, courts impose a strong presumption that the
adverse action was not motivated by discriminatory animus."'
Courts assume that if the employee received favorable treatment in
the past, it is unlikely that the employee has been discriminated
against, even when multiple actors are involved in decision making
regarding the employee. For example, in Sreeram, one member of
the plaintiff's Residency Review Committee granted Dr. Sreeram's
request to complete an additional year of residency when the
Committee recommended expulsion. That same committee then
expelled Dr. Sreeram the next year."O Because the final decision to
expel Dr. Sreeram included the doctor who had previously delayed
her expulsion, the court presumed that that doctor (and by
extension, the rest of the Committee) must not have acted on the
basis of sex and family responsibilities discrimination. 2 1 This
reasoning is faulty for the obvious reason that even if the member
of the Committee who had previously acted positively toward Dr.
Sreeram had acted without prejudice (which seems unlikely in Dr.
Sreeram's case), that member might have been pressured or
outvoted by the rest of the Committee the following year. The one
237. SeeRudman & Borgida, supra note 117, at 510-11.
238. Sreerarn v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 188 F.3d 314, 320-21
(5th Cir. 1999).
239. Id. at 317. For a discussion of Sreeram, see supra Part III.A.3.b.
240. Sreeram, 188 F.3d at 317.
241. Id. at 321.
1070 [Vol. 41:3
39
Miller: The Use (and Misuse) of the Same-Actor Inference in Family Respon
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
THE SAME-ACTOR INFERENCE IN FRD CASES
member's non-discrimination in no way indicates that other
Committee members acted without discrimination .242
Furthermore, social psychological research reveals many
reasons why an employee might receive different treatment from a
group of supervisors at different times-favorable treatment on
some occasions does not weaken the inference that an adverse
action against the employee was discriminatory.243 Research
indicates that the workplace can impose structural constraints on
214discriminatory behavior. A supervisor who inhibits discrimination
against an employee in one situation-for example, by giving the
employee a promotion-may simply do so because the
circumstances surrounding the decision are such that
245
discrimination would be obvious. This inhibited discrimination
would not weaken the inference that a different supervisor on a
different day engaged in discrimination against the same employee.
Research on moral credentialing also makes clear that this process2-46
can operate at the group level. A supervisor whose organization
has treated a member of a protected class favorably in the past may
feel morally credentialed by proxy and become more likely to
discriminate against the employee. Thus, there is no basis for the
assumption that when an employee has received favorable
treatment from some actors in an organization, all conduct toward
that employee from all actors is non-discriminatory.
242. Other courts have recognized that non-biased supervisors and decision
makers can be influenced by other biased actors within the company. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 478 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding
possible discrimination where the manager who decided to terminate the plaintiff
did not know that the plaintiff was black, but relied exclusively on information
provided by the plaintiffs immediate supervisor, who allegedly harbored racial
bias); Griffin v. Wash. Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(asserting that "evidence of a subordinate's bias is relevant where the ultimate
decision maker is not insulated from the subordinate's influence"); Shager v.
Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding discriminatory animus
where a hiring committee's decision to discharge a worker was "tainted" by the
supervisor's bias).
243. See supra Part II.B.2.
244. See supra Part II.B.2.
245. See Darley & Gross, supra note 70, at 27-28; see also Hodson et al., supra
note 70, at 469; Snyder et al., supra note 68, at 2303-04.
246. See supra Part II.B.2.
247. See Kouchaki, supra note 96, at 713.
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d. Actor and Target in the Same Protected Class
Courts impose a strong presumption that the adverse action
was not motivated by discriminatory animus when an actor takes an
adverse action toward a member of the same protected class as the
248
actor. Courts assume that individuals could not harbor negative
stereotypes or engage in discrimination against their own group.
However, social psychological research reveals many reasons why a
supervisor might discriminate against a member of his or her own
protected class. In the context of sex discrimination in particular,
there is significant evidence from social psycholop, that both men
and women can endorse traditional gender roles. '9 It could be the
case that the employee has not lived up to the supervisor's
stereotypes about what is proper behavior for members of their
class. The research indicates that penalties for men and women
who have family responsibilities are based in prescriptive
251stereotypes about the proper roles of men and women.
Penalizing a member of one's own class for violating these gender
212norms is quite common, and it constitutes FRD.
Taken together, the social psychological research on FRD, and
stereotyping and discrimination more broadly, establishes that
discrimination is a context-dependent process. The fact of an
actor's non-discrimination in one situation (or shared membership
248. See, e.g., James v. Verizon, 792 F. Supp. 2d 861, 869-70 (D. Md. 2011);
Vernon v. A & L Motor Sales, Civ. Action No. 07-1508, 2009 WL 866851, at *5
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2009); Aceto v. Town of Bloomfield, Civ. No.
3:04CV01877(AWT), 2006 WL 1405579, at *5 (D. Conn. May 19, 2006);Jackson v.
Sch. Bd. of Richmond, No. 99-CV-642, 2000 WL 34292578, at *7 (E.D. Va. Mar.
15, 2000). But see Wexler v. White's Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 574 (6th
Cir. 2003) (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78
(1998)) ("[T]he idea that one member of a group is unlikely to discriminate
against another member of the same group ... has been explicitly rejected by the
Supreme Court in the context of race and sex discrimination.").
249. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
250. E.g.,Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 744-45 (7th Cir. 1999); see
also Walsh v. Nat'l Computer Sys., Inc., 332 F.3d 1150, 1160 (8th Cir. 2003);
Marchioli v. Garland Co., No. 5:11-CV-124(MAD/ATB), 2011 WL 1983350, at *2-
3 (N.D.N.Y. May 20, 2011).
251. Cultural Schemas, supra note 27, at 220-22.
252. See generally, e.g., Berdahl & Moon, supra note 61; Coltrane et al., supra
note 40; Fuegen et al., supra note 44; Heilman, supra note 41; Heilman &
Okimoto, supra note 46; Rudman & Mescher, supra note 40; Vandello et al., supra
note 40.
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in a protected class) is simply not evidence that the actor's current
conduct is nondiscriminatory. In some cases, an act of
nondiscrimination can even make it more likely that the individual
253will discriminate in the future. There is no basis for the same-
actor inference in empirical reality, and same-actor evidence is
minimally probative in an FRD case.
B. The Same-Actor Inference Has Caused Significant Harm in FRD
Jurisprudence
Not only is same-actor evidence not particularly probative in
determining whether an adverse action was motivated by FRD, the
same-actor inference is unduly prejudicial to plaintiffs in FRD
cases. Given that the purpose of Title VII is to eliminate
discrimination based on sex and other classifications, 54 the use of
the same-actor inference in FRD cases is difficult to justify. As of
2008, "[e]very federal circuit had adopted some form of the same-
actor" inference.255 In circuits that use the same-actor inference in
its most restrictive forms, same-actor evidence leads to a strong
inference against discrimination, creating what amounts to a nearly
2516irrebuttable presumption that most plaintiffs cannot overcome.
In the circuits that use the same-actor inference in more
moderated forms, courts tend to consider same-actor evidence
holistically alongside other evidence. 25' Taken together, it is no
wonder that the federal courts are perceived as increasingly hostile
venues for employment discrimination plaintiffs. 2 The remainder
of this section will analyze the damage that the same-actor
inference causes in the context of FRD jurisprudence.
253. See, e.g., Gordijn et al., supra note 111, at 212; Monin & Miller, supra note
89, at 39-40.
254. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999).
255. See Martin, supra note 157, at 1128.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1129.
258. Bernice B. Donald &J. Eric Pardue, Bringing Back Reasonable Inferences: A
Short, Simple Suggestion for Addressing Some Problems at the Intersection of Employment
Discrimination and Summary Judgment, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 749, 750 (2012); Kerri
Lynn Stone, Shortcuts in Employment Discrimination Law, 56 ST. Louis U. L.J. 111, 112
(2011).
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1. The Same-Actor Inference Leads to the Dismissal of Meritorious
Cases at Summary Judgment
The use of the same-actor inference during the summary
judgment stage of an FRD case is extremely prejudicial to the
plaintiff. Even when a plaintiff meets his or her burden under the
McDonnell-Douglas framework during this stage by presenting
evidence of pretext, the same-actor inference allows the court to• • 259
dismiss the plaintiffs claim.
a. Curtailing Discovery
Under the McDonnell-Douglas framework, a plaintiff must
present evidence that whatever non-discriminatory reason the
employer gave for taking the adverse action is mere pretext.
When plaintiffs are able to present some evidence of pretext and
discrimination during the summary judgment stage, their cases
should proceed to trial to be heard by a jury. Unfortunately, even
when a plaintiff is able to present evidence of pretext and
discrimination, the same-actor inference allows the court to dismiss
the plaintiffs claim.26' Some have argued that although the same-
actor inference is meant to be a rebuttable presumption at its
strongest, it amounts to an irrebuttable presumption during
262summary judgment. Very few plaintiffs can marshal the evidence
they need to overcome this presumption, particularly when they
have not begun or completed discovery. Without discovery, access
to evidence is severely asymmetrical in an employment
discrimination case. The employer has access to records of
everything the plaintiff ever did, all email communications that
took place within the organization with regard to the plaintiff, all
259. Donald & Pardue, supra note 258, at 758.
260. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973) ("In
sum, respondent should have been allowed to pursue his claim under § 703(a) (1).
If the evidence on retrial is substantially in accord with that before us in this case,
we think that respondent carried his burden of establishing a prima facie case of
racial discrimination and that petitioner successfully rebutted that case. But this
does not end the matter. On retrial, respondent must be afforded a fair
opportunity to demonstrate that petitioner's assigned reason for refusing to re-
employ was a pretext or discriminatory in its application.").
261. Donald & Pardue, supra note 258, at 758.
262. Ross B. Goldman, Putting Pretext in Context: Employment Discrimination, the
Same-Actor Inference, and the Proper Roles ofJudges and Juries, 93 VA. L. REv7. 1533, 1559
(2007); Martin, supra note 144, at 379.
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records relating to other employees who may be used as
comparators, and more. Except in rare cases, plaintiffs are unlikely
to have access to anything more than their own pay stubs and their
memories of conversations they had in the workplace. When the
same-actor inference is used during the summary judgment stage
before discovery has been completed, the evidentiary burden on
plaintiffs is raised to the highest point possible at a time when
plaintiffs have the least evidence to work with. The result is that
courts "effectively grant immunity to employers when same actors
are involved.
2 63
b. Bluring the Roles ofJudge and Jury
Not only does the same-actor inference create such a high
evidentiary barrier to plaintiffs during summary judgment as to
constitute near immunity for employers, it allows courts to play a
role that many regard as improper during the summary judgment
stage. Some argue that the same-actor inference "gives courts the
opportunity to weigh the plaintiff's and defendant's respective
cases and find for the defendant based on one discrete fact rather
than acknowledge factual disputes from the whole of the proof
presented. ''26 ' This fact weighing is particularly problematic in the
summary judgment stage, when facts are supposed to be
265considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
The use of the same-actor inference during summary judgment
effectively strips a plaintiff of his or her right, as the non-moving
party, to have factual disputes reasonably resolved in his or her
263 Martin, supra note 144, at 380.
264. Donald & Pardue, supra note 258, at 758; see also Stone, supra note 258, at
113. Scholars have identified
an "anti-plaintiff effect," whereby employment discrimination plaintiffs
appear to be systemically disadvantaged by judicial skepticism toward
the plausibility of what they are alleging.
This effect is manifest in the "shortcut" doctrines that premise
often lethal inferences against employment discrimination plaintiffs on
simplistic caricatures of the mechanics of human behavior and
workplace dynamics. A "shortcut," as the term is used in this Article,
may be defined as a label or inference that proxies for reasoned
analysis. Shortcuts unfairly skew toward a defendant's case by
permitting or compelling a trier to make unwarranted assumptions or
to attach undue significance to a single fact or facet of a case.
Id. (citations omitted).
265. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
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favor. 266 Instead of taking the existing evidence of pretext at face
value and determining that a reasonable jury could find for the
plaintiff, many courts use the same-actor inference to effectively
nullify the evidence the plaintiff has presented and dispose of the
case. The courts thus invade the fact-finding territory of the
jury 2 6 and "wrongly deny plaintiffs the statutory right to a jury
verdict.2611
For example, in Haynes v. Gernsbacher's, Inc., the plaintiff was
270hired as a showroom sales manager by Harold Gernsbacher. On
one occasion, Haynes asked to speak to Gernsbacher about her
position, and he replied, "as long as it doesn't have to do with
money, because all you women want is money., 271 A few months
later, Haynes underwent surgery to remove her ovaries and took
272
four weeks of medical leave from work. The day Haynes returned
to work, Gernsbacher terminated her and then replaced her with a273
man. Furthermore, Gernsbacher did not follow the company's
own policy on using progressive discipline before terminating an
266. Martin, supra note 144, at 382. See generally Donald & Pardue, supra note
258 (discussing "the federal judiciary's attitude towards employment
discrimination plaintiffs and how that perceived hostility is manifested, particularly
at the summaryjudgment state of litigation").
267. See, e.g., Sreeram v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 188 F.3d 314,
320 (5th Cir. 1999).
Even after indulging in every reasonable inference in favor of the
Dr. Sreeram, we find that the record is so suffused with evidence that
the Dr. Sreeram was unqualified, that no rational trier of fact could
conclude that Dr. Sreeram was terminated for any reason other than
her deficiencies as a surgeon. Thus, we find that Dr. Sreeram did not
present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Dr. Sreeram's
termination proffered by appellees was pretextual.
Id.
268. Martin, supra note 144, at 378; see also Wexler v. White's Fine Furniture,
Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a mandatory presumption of
non-discrimination based on same-actor evidence because it is inconsistent "with
the requirement that, in considering a motion for summary judgment, the court
must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party").
269. Goldman, supra note 262, at 1560.
270. Haynes v. Gernsbacher's, Inc., No. 4:01-CV-594-A, 2002 WL 1783905, at
*1 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2002).
271. Id.
272. Id. at *2.
273. Id.
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employee.2 7' The court ruled that because Gernsbacher had both
hired and fired Haynes, Haynes's evidence of pretext was not
strong enough to overcome the court's strong inference of non-
275discrimination. Certainly a reasonable jury could find that
Gernsbacher engaged in discrimination, given Gernsbacher's
comment about women, the fact that he fired her the day she
returned from reproduction-related medical leave, the fact that he
violated his company's own termination policy, and the fact that he
replaced Haynes with a male employee. However, the court
invaded the fact-finding territory of the jury, weighed the evidence
on its own, and brushed aside this entire body of evidence in favor
of the solitary fact that the man who terminated Haynes was the
one who had hired her in the first place.
Another case, Dejarnette v. Coming Inc., demonstrates that this
same problem can occur as part of a judgment as a matter of law,
which, for our purposes, uses the same standard of review as
summary judgment. In DeJarnette, the plaintiff was hired as a
probationary employee and was terminated before she could be
instated as a full-time employee." Dejarnette was hired by Kathy
Schrock, who knew that Dejarnette was pregnant at the time and
278said that this would not be a problem for employment.
Dejarnette received mediocre evaluations from her direct
supervisor during her probationary employment period and was
eventually terminated.. Throughout the pleadings and into trial,
Corning's alleged reasons for terminating Dejarnette were
inconsistent, and Dejarnette offered several forms of evidence to
establish that her job performance was better than Corning
274. Id. at *4.
275. Id. at *3-4.
276. See 133 F.3d 293, 297 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that the court would
"examine the evidence in the light most favorable to Dejarnette, the nonmoving
party," that the motion "should be granted with respect to an issue if there is no
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for [the
nonmoving] party[,]" and that the court "may not weigh the evidence, pass on the
credibility of the witnesses, or substitute [its] judgment of the facts for that of the
jury" (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Brown v. CSX Transp., Inc., 18
F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1994))).
277. Id. at 295-96.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 296.
280. Id. at 300 (Murnaghan,J., dissenting).
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asserted. The jury eventually found that Dejarnette was
discriminated against on the basis of her pregnancy, and it awarded
2822her substantial damages.
The appellate court, in reviewing Corning's motion for
judgment as a matter of law, overturned the jury's verdict and283
dismissed Dejarnette's case. The court asserted that because
some of the same actors were involved in Dejarnette's hiring and
2814termination, the same-actor inference applied. The court
concluded that Dejarnette's evidence of pretext was simply not
enough to overcome the presumption that because somebody at
Corning knew that DeJarnette was pregnant at the time she was
hired, no reasonable jury could find that her termination wasd. . 285
discriminatory. The court's reliance on the same-actor inference
in this case is particularly striking, because not only did the court
invade the fact-finding domain of the jury and weigh the credibility
of various pieces of evidence on its own, 28 but it did so after the
287
jury had already decided in favor of Dejarnette.
As these examples illustrate, it is unreasonably difficult for
FRD plaintiffs to have their cases decided by juries. The same-actor
inference raises the evidentiary bar extremely high for plaintiffs at
a point in litigation when they have the least access to the evidence
they need. The same-actor inference also allows judges to
281. Id. at 299 (majority opinion).
282. Id. at 297.
283. Id. at 300.
284. Id. at 298. The majority's use of the same-actor inference in this case is
even more problematic than usual due to the fact that, as the dissent correctly
pointed out, the majority fudged the facts significantly on this point; it is not at all
clear that the same people were involved in Dejarnette's hiring and termination.
Id. at 300 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) ("Reliance sua sponte by the majority on
Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991), for the proposition that hiring
and firing by the same individual constitutes an inference of non-discrimination is
notjustified. Schrock did the hiring, Breznay the firing.").
285. Id. at 298 (majority opinion).
286. Id. at 300 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (citing Taylor v. Home Ins. Co.,
777 F.2d 849, 854 (4th Cir. 1985); Abasiekong v. City of Shelby, 744 F.2d 1055,
1059 (4th Cir. 1984)) ("The issue of credibility of the witnesses is not for us.
Dejarnette, as the non-moving party, was entitled to the benefit of 'every
legitimate inference' in her favor. That is especially true where determinations of
motive and causation are critical." (quoting Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413,
1419 (4th Cir. 1991))).
287. Id.
288. See supra Part III.B. l.a-b.
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circumvent the normal summary judgment standards and enter
summary judgment for an employer even when a reasonable jury
could find for the plaintiff.
2. The Same-Actor Inference Causes Meritorious Cases to Lose at
Trial
For those plaintiffs in FRD cases who proceed to trial and have
their cases decided by juries, the same-actor inference continues to
be prejudicial enough to outweigh any minimal probative value it
may have. 28 It is no accident that the same-actor inference presents
such a high evidentiary barrier to plaintiffs; the Proud court made
clear that the same-actor inference was designed to dispose of
plaintiffs' discrimination cases in high numbers.2 ° Once an
employer brings same-actor evidence, it establishes a strong
presumption that its non-discriminatory motives for taking an
adverse action against the plaintiff are non-pretextual under the
McDonnell-Douglas framework.9 The plaintiff can attempt to offer
evidence showing that the employer's motives are in fact
pretextual, but, as the Proud court stated, "in most cases . . .such
evidence will not be forthcoming. 2 12 Furthermore, courts that use
the strongest forms of the same-actor inference have not
articulated what kind of evidence it would take for a plaintiff to
overcome this evidentiary burden.29 3
Among the judiciary, the same-actor inference allows judges
"to proxy monolithic assumptions for the individualized reasoned
analyses mandated by the relevant antidiscrimination legislation."
29 4
Among jurors, the same-actor inference causes serious problems
because it encourages members of the lay public to rely on faulty
assumptions about human psychology that do not comport with
social psychological science. The same-actor inference leads fact-
finders to substitute a holistic analysis of the entire body of
evidence with overly simplistic, inaccurate beliefs about how
discrimination operates, and the inference causes some courts to
289. Martin, supra note 144, at 392-93.
290. Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 798 (4th Cir. 1991).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Martin, supra note 144, at 367.
294. Stone, supra note 258, at 111.
295. See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 64, at 1039-53.
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give disproportional weight to one piece of minimally probative
evidence that favors the employer.
3. The Same-Actor Inference Creates Perverse Incentives for
Employers
In addition to the problems caused by the same-actor
inference during litigation, the same-actor inference doctrine also
does harm outside of the courtroom by creating perverse incentives
for employers to engage in conduct that undermines anti-
discrimination law. First, the same-actor inference creates near
immunity for employers who hire individuals in a protected class.'
9 6
The same-actor inference affords employers "protection in the
event they decide to rid the workplace of individuals in protected
categories under Title VII., '297 This near immunity seems to be no
accident. When the Proud court first articulated the same-actor
inference, it explained that "employers who knowingly hire workers
within a protected group seldom will be credible targets for charges
of pretextual firing.""' It is possible, for example, that workplaces
that hire women with children could use the inference to place an
inordinate amount of weight on that fact, rather than having to
present evidence of non-discrimination against the plaintiff. This
problem may be particularly severe in FRD cases, because they are
typically sex-plus cases in which the protected class is sometimes
ambiguous and can be misidentified by the courts.300
Second, the same-actor inference defies the purpose of Title
VII and other anti-discrimination laws by allowing employers to
abdicate their responsibility to address unequal employment
opportunities. The purpose of Title VII is not merely to provide
remedies to employees who have been wronged, but to eliminate
the problem of employment discrimination in the United States."
296. Martin, supra note 157, at 1122.
297. Id.
298. Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 798 (4th Cir. 1991).
299. See generally Wendi Barish, "Sex-Plus" Discrimination: A Discussion of Fisher
v. Vassar College, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 239, 240-41 (1995) (discussing the
definition and types of sex-plus discrimination).
300. See, e.g., Hayden v. Garden Ridge Mgmt., L.L.C., Civil Action No.
4:08CV172, 2009 WL 5196718, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2009) (assessing the
individual's claims based solely on the individual's gender rather than assessing
the individual's family responsibility as the core of the discrimination).
301. See, e.g., Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 528 (1999)
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The availability of the same-actor inference in defense of
discrimination cases "exonerates employers from their
responsibility to address structural and cultural barriers to
workplace equality, forces within the employers' control and which
often they employ strategically for business reasons.,301
The use of the same-actor inference in FRD cases is
problematic at any stage. It prevents plaintiffs from conducting
much needed discovery, allows judges to improperly blur the roles
of judge and jury during summary judgment, places
disproportionate weight on a single piece of minimally probative
evidence at trial, and encourages employers not to make efforts to
prevent employment discrimination in the first place.
IV. THE SAME-ACTOR INFERENCE SHOULD BE ABOLISHED
IN FRD CASES UNDER TITLE VII
The same-actor inference should be abolished from all FRD
cases under Title VII. Same-actor evidence is minimally probative at
best and is highly prejudicial to FRD plaintiffs. Furthermore,
eliminating the same-actor inference would not be difficult for
courts to do. It would simply require that the courts adhere to the
same summary judgment and evidentiary standards that they use in
other Title VII cases not involving same-actor issues. Given how
simple it would be to make this reform, it may seem unnecessary to
lay out a detailed case for this proposal. However, because the
same-actor inference is so "fully entrenched in workplace
[discrimination] law,, 0 3 with the majority of the circuits using its
"most potent form" to create barriers for plaintiffs,"" it is clearly
necessary to make the case for its elimination.
("Dissuading employers from implementing programs or policies to prevent
workplace discrimination is directly contrary to Title ViI's prophylactic
purposes."); Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp.
Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1110 (1983) ("[A] central purpose of Title VII is to
prevent employers from treating individual workers on the basis of sexual or racial
group characteristics."); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)
("The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the
language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities
and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group
of white employees over other employees.").
302. Martin, supra note 157, at 1122.
303. Id. at 1121.
304. Id.
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A. What Eliminating the Same-Actor Inference Would Entail
Under a system in which the same-actor inference was not
available, FRD plaintiffs would present whatever evidence they had
to make a prima facie case under the McDonnell-Douglas framework.
During summary judgment, a plaintiff would need to show that he
or she belonged to a protected class under Title VII, met the
employer's legitimate expectations for job performance, suffered
an adverse employment action, and that the circumstances gave
rise to the inference that this action was based on sex. It would
not be particularly difficult for most plaintiffs to make a prima facie
case if their claims had merit. Because the plaintiff would typically
be the non-moving party in a motion for summary judgment,
courts would consider the facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. 06 Same-actor evidence (i.e., the names of those who made
positive and adverse employment decisions regarding the plaintiff)
might arise in the course of explaining the timeline of events, but
courts would refrain from using this information as evidence of
non-discrimination, and it would not raise the evidentiary burden
for the plaintiff. If the employee were able to make a prima facie
case for discrimination, the employer defendant would offer
evidence of a non-discriminatory motive for the adverse action.3 0 7
This motive would not be particularly difficult to supply either, as
most employers can point to some shortcoming of their employees
when pressed to do so. Finally, in the third stage of the McDonnell-
Douglas framework, the plaintiff would present some evidence that
the non-discriminatory reason offered by the employer was mere
pretext for discrimination.3 08 This stage would be more difficult for
the employee because employers often do not leave paper trails
evidencing their discriminatory motives. However, if the plaintiff
could offer just enough evidence that a reasonable jury could find
pretext, he or she would satisfy the McDonnell-Douglas burden-
shifting framework and the judge would deny the motion for
summaryjudgment. 9
305. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Hayden,
2009 WL 5196718, at *5.
306. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
307. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
308. Id. at 804.
309. See, e.g., Meier v. Noble Hospitality, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184 (S.D.
Iowa 2001).
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At trial, the plaintiff would make his or her case for
discrimination to the jury. It would be advisable for the plaintiff to
move in limine to exclude same-actor evidence," ° so that jurors
could not make improper inferences of non-discrimination from
the fact that, for example, the same individual promoted and then
fired the plaintiff. In many (albeit, not all) cases, it would not be
difficult to exclude this evidence; the employer could simply testify
about the circumstances surrounding the positive employment
decision without naming the people behind that decision.
Furthermore, if the employer had been taking appropriate steps to
prevent discrimination in the workplace, it would have plenty of
other, more probative, pieces of evidence to offer.
If the court deemed it improper or impracticable to exclude
same-actor evidence, the plaintiff could consider asking for a jury
instruction advising the jury that the same-actor evidence should
not create a presumption of non-discrimination. However, this
instruction should not be considered a viable alternative to
outright exclusion.Jury instructions not to consider certain types of
evidence have been found to be fairly ineffective, and may serve
only to draw attention to the evidence in question."' The plaintiff
could also consider offering expert social psychological testimony
to explain to the jury why an incident of non-discrimination in the
past is not evidence of non-discrimination in the present. Such
testimony may help to prevent jurors from using same-actor
reasoning on their own or implicitly applying a same-actor
inference to raise the evidentiary bar for the plaintiff. Ideally, the
jury would weigh all of the evidence presented by both parties and
make its own determinations of credibility. The important point is
that if same-actor evidence is present at trial, it would be regarded,
at most, as just one minor piece of evidence within the whole body
of evidence.
It should be clear from this description of an FRD case that
eliminating the same-actor inference would not be a
groundbreaking move on the part of the courts. Litigating FRD
cases without the same-actor inference would simply bring these
310. See Martin, supra note 144, at 392. For example, a plaintiff could move to
exclude same-actor evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, on the grounds
that the risk of unfair prejudice to the plaintiff substantially outweighs the
probative value of the evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
311. E.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on
Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1864-65 (2001).
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cases in line with other Title VII cases in which there is no same-
'312
actor situation. Given the significant problems that the same-
actor inference causes in FRD litigation, the minimally probative
value of same-actor evidence, and the simplicity of the necessary
reform, it is difficult to justify the courts' continued use of the
same-actor inference.
B. Benefits of Eliminating the Same-Actor Inference
The potential benefits of eliminating the same-actor inference
from FRD cases under Title VII are enormous. First, by eliminating
this barrier during the summary judgment stage, plaintiffs will be
less likely to have their cases dismissed before they have even
completed discovery. Removing the presumption at the summary
judgment stage is extremely important given the significant
disadvantage plaintiffs experience in accessing evidence. Before
discovery is complete, plaintiffs are much more likely to defeat a
motion for summary judgment under the standard McDonnell-
Douglas analysis when the only requirement is some credible
evidence of pretext and discrimination, rather than when the same-
actor inference is imposed. If courts no longer imposed nearly
irrebuttable presumptions of non-discrimination during this phase,
they would no longer "effectively grant immunity to employers
when same actors are involved.,
31 3
312. See, e.g., Eslinger v. U.S. Cent. Credit Union, 866 F. Supp. 491, 498-99 (D.
Kan. 1994). The court reasoned:
Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot, and has not, met her
burden to produce evidence indicating that U.S. Central's explanation
for her termination is a pretext for unlawful gender discrimination
because Mr. Bell, the individual who eliminated her position, is the
same individual who promoted plaintiff ... while she was pregnant
with her second child. ...
... However, . . . [c]onsidering the evidence as a whole, the court
believes there to be sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury
could conclude that gender played a role in the decision to terminate
plaintiff. Giving plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences
flowing from the evidence presented, to which she is entitled upon a
motion for summary judgment, the court is compelled to find in her
favor. The court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that there is an
absence of evidence in support of plaintiff's claim.
Id.
313 Martin, supra note 144, at 380.
1084 [Vol. 41:3
53
Miller: The Use (and Misuse) of the Same-Actor Inference in Family Respon
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
THE SAME-ACTOR INFERENCE IN FRD CASES
Second, eliminating the same-actor inference would force
courts to play a more appropriate role during the summary
judgment stage, rather than invading the fact-finding territory of
the jury.3 Using the same-actor inference during summary
judgment, courts "weigh the plaintiffs and defendant's respective
cases and find for the defendant based on one discrete fact rather
than acknowledge factual disputes from the whole of the proof
presented. ''1 15 The use of the same-actor inference thus strips
plaintiffs of their right, as the non-moving party, to have factual
disputes reasonably resolved in their favor.316 Although some argue
that the same-actor inference helps courts to eliminate frivolous
claims during summary judgment and reduce their caseloads,317 the
realit is that cases with merit are too often being disposed of this
way. Congress enacted Title VII in order to reduce employment
discrimination, 3'9 and courts cannot simply recite inferences in
order to abdicate their responsibility to provide remedies for
victims of discrimination. Without the ability to use the same-actor
inference to impose significant evidentiary burdens on FRD
plaintiffs, courts would no longer be able to dispose of plaintiffs'
cases during summary judgment in spite of the existence of
adequate evidence to support a finding of discrimination from a
reasonable jury.
Third, without the availability of the same-actor inference and
the near immunity that it provides, employers may be incentivized
to take more effective steps to prevent discrimination in the
workplace. Although more social psychological research is needed
on the types of structural workplace factors that decrease FRD in
314. See Goldman, supra note 262, at 1560-62; Martin, supra note 144, at 377-
78.
315. Donald & Pardue, supra note 258, at 758; see also Stone, supra note 258, at
113.
316. Martin, supra note 144, at 382. See generally Donald & Pardue, supra note
258, at 753-54.
317. See Bryant & Bales, supra note 147, at 279; Goldman, supra note 262, at
1556.
318. See Goldman, supra note 262, at 1560.
319. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 528 (1999); Ariz.
Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris,
463 U.S. 1073, 1110 (1983) (citing City of L.A., Dep't of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1978)); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
429-30 (1971).
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S 320employment, there exists a significant body of best practices that
employers could implement to reduce discrimination. The Center
for WorkLife Law, for example, offers a list of best practices for
employers interested in reducing the risk of FRD. These practices
include conducting meaningful training for supervisors, addressing
FRD in official anti-discrimination policies, conducting periodic
self-audits of employment practices, holding managers accountable
for their decisions, establishing flexibility policies and supporting
employees who use them, and more.32 As social psychologists reveal
more and more ways to reduce FRD-even subtle, less-than-
conscious forms of FRD-in the workplace, it will become easier for
321employers to take affirmative steps to reduce discrimination.
Eliminating the same-actor inference from FRD cases will eliminate
what is currently a major disincentive to take these steps.
Fourth, eliminating the same-actor inference from the trial
setting will make it more likely that fact-finders will holistically
analyze the entire body of evidence, rather than placing
disproportionate emphasis on a single piece of minimally probative
evidence. As it now stands, once courts announce that the
employer has earned a strong presumption of non-discrimination,
any evidence short of a "smoking gun" written document admitting
that the company's reasons for the adverse action were pretextual is
unlikely to defeat the same-actor inference. Without the same-
actor inference, fact-finders can examine the entire body of
evidence in concert. Elimination of the inference and evidence to
that effect would not significantly reduce the amount of evidence
available to the employer. Employers could present all of the
evidence that would be relevant in any other discrimination case
not involving a same-actor issue; this might include comparator
evidence, statistical or other pattern-and-practice evidence,
evidence of non-discrimination policies and training efforts,
evidence of company self-audits to reduce discrimination, evidence
regarding the availability of flexibility policies, and evidence to
support the employer's non-discriminatory reason for taking the
320. See Miller, supra note 12, at 362.
321. See Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of the Law, Best Practices, CENTER
FOR WORKLIFE L., http://worklifelaw.org/frd/more-on-frd/for-employers/best
-practices (last visited Dec. 2, 2014).
322. Id.
323. See Miller, supra note 12, at 373.
324. See Martin, supra note 157, at 1129.
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adverse action. In fact, the more an employer makes efforts to put
in place the best practices discussed above (thus fulfilling the
primary purpose of Title VII325), the more evidence it would have in
support of its claim of non-discrimination. In short, employers
would not be significantly prejudiced by the exclusion of same-
actor evidence, as they would still have access to the full range of
evidence with probative value regarding non-discrimination. Fact-
finders should be given the opportunity and the obligation to
holistically review the body of evidence from each party and draw
inferences from the totality of the circumstances.
The final benefit of eliminating the same-actor inference is
that this reform would bring FRD law more in line with the
empirical realities of human behavior. The same-actor inference
relies on extremely faulty reasoning regarding how stereotyping
and discrimination operate, and the result has been a system of
anti-discrimination law that is hostile to those who suffer
326discrimination. When judges' folk theories of human behavior
align with empirical reality, they are equipped to make decisions
that further justice and the goals of public policy. By eliminating
the same-actor inference from FRD cases under Title VII, we can
begin to "close the gap between folk and scientific theories of the
person ''321 in the law and bring FRD jurisprudence more in line
with the original goals of Title VII.
Some scholars advocate simply removing the same-actor
inference from the summary judgment stage and continuing to use• ',328
it in trial. Although this solution would ameliorate some of the
harms caused by the same-actor inference in FRD cases, it would
leave many problems unsolved. This approach would not change
the fact that at trial, fact-finders could place disproportionate
emphasis on a single piece of minimally probative evidence. It
would not change the fact that the evidentiary burden on plaintiffs
would be raised to an unreasonable degree. It would not do much
325. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999); Ariz.
Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Coinp. Plans v. Norris,
463 U.S. 1073, 1110 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
326. Donald & Pardue, supra note 258, at 750; see also Stone, supra note 258, at
112.
327. Tyler & Jost, supra note 126, at 808.
328. See Donald & Pardue, supra note 258, at 762-63. See generally Goldman,
supra note 262.
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to increase employers' incentives to take actions that would prevent
discrimination in the workplace. It would certainly not change the
empirical reality that evidence of an actor's non-discriminatory act
in the past is simply not evidence of non-discrimination in the
present. Thus, although removing the same-actor inference from
the summary judgment stage and allowing plaintiffs to present
their cases to a jury is an important step in the right direction, it
simply does not go far enough to eliminate many of the harms that
the same-actor inference causes. The same-actor inference should
be eliminated altogether from FRD cases under Title VII.
V. CONCLUSION
FRD in the workplace is a major problem in today's society,
and it plays an important role in the gender disparities that persist
despite major legal reforms. Both men and women who are victims
of FRD deserve legal relief. Social psychological research on
stereotyping and discrimination has shed light on how dynamic
and context dependent these processes are. In particular, this body
of research makes clear that a single act of non-discrimination in
the past is no indication that an individual will not discriminate in
the future.
Unfortunately, the same-actor inference allows courts to infer
that because an individual took a positive action toward an
employee in the past, the individual's present actions are not
discriminatory in nature. Despite the fact that this presumption
flies in the face of decades of empirical knowledge from social
psychology, courts continue to use it to dispose of meritorious FRD
cases. Courts impose extremely high evidentiary burdens on
plaintiffs at a time when they have the least access to evidence, they
invade the territory of the jury by evaluating and weighing evidence
during summary judgment, they cause unfair prejudice to plaintiffs
in trial by leading fact-finders to place disproportional weight on a
single fact, and they create incentives for employers not to take
steps to reduce discrimination in accordance with Title VII. The
same-actor inference should be eliminated altogether from FRD
cases under Title VII. Not only would this reform be remarkably
simple to implement, it would also bring FRD jurisprudence more
in line with both the goals of Tide VII and the empirical reality of
how discrimination operates. By eliminating the same-actor
inference from FRD litigation, judges can adopt an empirically
grounded social psychological understanding of FRD, develop a
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body of law that reflects the realities of gender roles in modern
society, and provide the kind of justice to FRD plaintiffs that Title
VII is meant to provide.
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